SOL: +5 from majority, + 5 from last act, or +5 from narrow discovery, whichever is latest vs. perp; +1 from majority or accrual (at narrow discovery) vs. employer

1. + 5 vs perp

a. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.249 (2)  “A civil action for recovery of damages for injury or illness suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse or childhood sexual assault shall be brought before whichever of the following periods last expires: (a)  Within five (5) years of the commission of the act or the last of a series of acts by the same perpetrator;  (b)  Within five (5) years of the date the victim knew, or should have known, of the act; or    (c)  Within five (5) years after the victim attains the age of eighteen (18) years.”

2. + 1 year from accrual vs. employers

a. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a)  “The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: (a)  An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her husband, his wife, child, ward, apprentice, or servant”

b. Roman Catholic Bishop of Louisville v. Burden, 168 S.W.3d 414, 417-418, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 351, 8-9 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“Thus, it is clear that the focus of the General Assembly was on “victims” rather than those whom the “victims” might attempt to hold liable for abuse. However, the language of KRS 413.249, just as that used by the legislatures of Rhode Island, Colorado and California, appears to be directed at perpetrators and not third parties  since it sets forth sexual offenses which a third party, such as a church or a school would be incapable of committing. Based on the foregoing, it is the Opinion of this Court that KRS 413.249 does not apply to the cases currently before the Court”)

TOLLING:

a. Majority: yes.

i. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.249(2)(b) (“…[T]he date the victim knew, or should have known, of the act”) (versus perp) (statute applies vs perp only)

ii. Ky.Rev.Stat § 413.170 (1) (“ If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160, except for a penalty or forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of action accrued, an infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought within the same number of years after the removal of the disability or death of the person, whichever happens first, allowed to a person without the disability to bring the action after the right accrued.”) (versus all defendants)

b. Discovery, yes.

i. Yes, narrow (knowledge only):

1. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.249(2)(b) (“…[T]he date the victim knew, or should have known, of the act”) (statute applies vs. perp only)

2. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (“In the case sub judice, Secter does not allege memory loss and was aware of his injury (being sexually abused) within one year of his reaching the age of majority. Thus, his injury would not fall within the discovery rule under Rigazio, supra.”) (CL discovery rule in KY essentially =  tolling for fully repressed memories only)

a. Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.170(1) did not apply b/c even if the son later suffered from post-traumatic memory loss which made him of unsound mind, this had not been the case at the time of the abuse, when the action accrued).

None for felonies. KRS § 500.050 (1)

Ky. Rev. Stat. 500.050. (1)  Except as otherwise expressly provided, the prosecution of a felony is not subject to a period of limitation and may be commenced at any time.

KRS § 500.050 (3)  (“For a misdemeanor offense under KRS Chapter 510 when the victim is under the age of eighteen (18) at the time of the offense, the prosecution of the offense shall be commenced within five (5) years after the victim attains the age of eighteen (18) years.”) – MISDEMEANORS +5 from age 18.