Correspondence to: Rosaleen McElvaney, School of Nursing and Human Sciences, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin 9, Ireland. E-mail: rosaleen.mcelvaney@dcu.ie
‘The importance of understanding the dynamics of disclosure’
KEY PRACTITIONER MESSAGES
Children typically delay disclosing experiences of abuse.
Asking children questions about their wellbeing gives them the opportunity to tell when they are ready.
The challenge is to find the right questions at the right time.
Peers can be the right people to ask these questions.
Adolescents need to know about how to ask and what to do if someone tells.
Adolescents need to know about how to ask and what to do if someone tells.
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An issue of increasing concern in recent years is the phenomenon of delayed disclosure of childhood sexual abuse and the need to understand the process of how children and adults disclose their experiences of child sexual abuse, given the implications for child protection, social justice and mental health outcomes. This paper reviews the research on disclosure patterns of childhood sexual abuse, specifically delays in disclosure, non-disclosure (as evident through adult retrospective studies) and partial disclosures, and discusses implications for practice. Literature searches of the online databases PSYCINFO and Social Sciences Citation Index, in addition to manual searches of texts published since 2000, were conducted using the search terms ‘child sexual abuse’, ‘sex abuse’ and ‘disclosure’.
‘This paper reviews the research on disclosure patterns of childhood sexual abuse’
The research to date on disclosure patterns is based on two sampling methodologies – studies of adults reporting retrospective experiences and studies of children. The former group of studies has the benefit of drawing on large-scale national probability samples which can be considered to be representative of the general population. The latter group with some small exceptions (predominantly adolescent studies) uses samples of young people who have disclosed sexual abuse but would not be considered as representative of all children who have been abused:
‘children who decide to tell someone about being sexually abused and whose cases therefore come to court are not representative of sexually abused children in general’ (Olafson and Lederman, 2006, p. 29).
Patterns of Disclosure: Delays and Non-disclosure
There is consensus in the research literature that most people who experience sexual abuse in childhood do not disclose this abuse until adulthood, and when disclosure does occur in childhood, significant delays are common. Table 1 summarises two large-scale studies to highlight the extent of delays in disclosure and the percentage of those who did not disclose to anyone prior to the study.
Table 1. Patterns of disclosure – delay and non-disclosure
‘Most people who experience sexual abuse in childhood do not disclose this abuse until adulthood’
Kogan (2004) examined the timing of disclosure of unwanted sexual experiences in childhood or adolescence in a sub-sample (n = 263 adolescent women, aged 12 to 17) of the National Survey of Adolescents (Kilpatrick and Saunders, 1995) in the USA – a nationally representative study. Kogan’s results can be summarised as follows: immediate disclosure (within 1 month) 43 per cent, delayed disclosure (less than 1 year) 31 per cent and non-disclosure (disclosed only during the survey) 26 per cent. Smith and colleagues (2000) examined a sub-sample (n = 288) of the National Women’s Study in the USA (Resnick et al., 1993, cited in Smith et al., 2000) who had reported a childhood rape prior to the age of 18. Smith et al.’s findings can be summarised as follows: immediate disclosure (within 1 month) 27 per cent, delayed disclosure (more than a year) 58 per cent and non-disclosure (survey only) 28 per cent. Those who had never disclosed prior to the survey constitute comparable proportions in these two studies while the rates for immediate disclosure are higher in the adolescent study than in the adult study, a reassuring finding given the increased awareness of sexual abuse in society during the past 20 years.
‘The rates for immediate disclosure are lower in the adolescent study than in the adult study’
Goodman-Brown and colleagues (2003) examined USA district attorney files of 218 children. Their categories were slightly different from the previous two studies but in summary, immediate disclosers (within 1 month) constituted 64 per cent of the sample while 29 per cent disclosed within six months. This study is unusual insofar as the sample studied had reported their experience of abuse to the authorities and a prosecution was in progress. Goodman-Brown et al. also pointed out that families who participated in this study were more likely to represent those children who experienced abuse by someone outside the family. Research has found that delays in disclosure are longer for those abused within the family (Sjoberg and Lindblad, 2002; Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Kogan, 2004; Hershkowitz et al., 2005). Therefore, children who disclose more promptly may be overrepresented in legal samples.
‘Children who disclose more promptly may be overrepresented in legal samples’
In Sweden, Priebe and Svedin (2008) conducted a national survey of 4339 adolescents, of whom 1962 reported some form of sexual abuse (65% of girls and 23% of boys). Details of the time lapse in disclosing were not available from this study. However, of those who had disclosed and answered the questions on disclosure (n = 1493), 59.5 per cent had told no-one of their experiences prior to the survey. Of those who did disclose, 80.5 per cent mentioned a ‘friend of my own age’ as the only person who they had told. In this study, 6.8 per cent had reported their experiences to the social authorities or police. A further Swedish study of 122 women who had experienced childhood sexual abuse (Jonson and Lindblad, 2004) found that 32 per cent disclosed during childhood (before the age of 18) while the majority told in adulthood (68%). The delay was up to 49 years, with an average of 21 years (SD = 12.9). Of those who told in childhood, 59 per cent told only one person. In Ireland, the SAVI study (n = 3118, McGee et al., 2002) found that 47 per cent of those respondents who had experienced some form of sexual assault prior to age 17 had told no-one of this experience until the survey. McElvaney (2002) investigated delay in a legal sample of ten adults who had made formal complaints of childhood sexual abuse in Ireland and found delays ranging from 20 years to 50 years.
‘Delays ranging from 20 years to 50 years’
Studies of children in the context of forensic/investigative interviews where children are interviewed by professionals due to concerns that the child has been sexually abused also point to high non-disclosure rates, particularly striking in cases where there is corroborative evidence that abuse has occurred – medical evidence (Lyon, 2007), or confessions from the abuser or videotaped evidence/witness reports (Sjoberg and Lindblad, 2002). Lyon (2007) reported his findings from a review of studies published between 1965 and 1993 of children diagnosed with gonorrhoea where the average disclosure rate among 579 children was 43 per cent (n = 250). In a study where the evidence for the abuse was available on videotape, children have denied abuse when interviewed by the police (Sjoberg and Lindblad, 2002).
In summary, significant numbers of children do not disclose experiences of sexual abuse until adulthood and adult survey results suggest that significant proportions of adults have never disclosed such abuse, as evidenced by the high numbers of respondents disclosing to researchers for the first time.
‘High numbers of respondents disclosing to researchers for the first time’
Patterns of Disclosure – Partial Disclosure
Information on how children disclose over time can be obtained from studies of children who participated in forensic/investigative interviews where children are interviewed by professionals due to concerns that the child has been sexually abused. The issue of partial disclosures was highlighted by earlier studies such as those by DeVoe and Faller (1999) of five- to ten-year olds (i.e. making detailed informal disclosures that were not replicated in formal interviews) and Elliott and Briere (1994) of children aged eight to 15 years (i.e. disclosing only partial information until confronted with external evidence that led to more complete disclosures).
More recently, investigators have examined the role of the interviewer and questioning styles in the forensic interview and how this impacts on children’s disclosures and the level of detail provided in interview. Hershkowitz et al. (2006) compared tapes of interviews with children who disclosed sexual abuse and those who did not (but about whom there was ‘substantial’ reason to believe that they had been abused). They found that interviewers behaved differently with the two groups, using different types of prompts with children who presented as somewhat uncooperative, offered fewer details and gave more uninformative responses at the beginning of the interview. It would appear that interviewers responded to less communicative children by increasing the proportion of closed questions which in turn led to children being less forthcoming. Lamb et al. (2002) have found that the use of a protocol that emphasises the use of prompts that elicit free narrative (e.g. ‘tell me about that’) as compared with closed questions (those requiring a yes/no response) has resulted in more detail and more accuracy in children’s accounts.
‘They found that interviewers behaved differently with the two groups’
Although few studies exist that examine the phenomenon of disclosure in informal settings (when disclosure is made to a friend or family member), some qualitative studies have described this process. McElvaney (2008) quoted one teenage girl who described hinting to her mother prior to disclosing the experience: ‘I didn’t tell her what happened but I was saying things that made her think it made her think that it happened but I didn’t tell her’ (p. 127). A parent described how her teenage son told her over a period of days, keeping the most difficult parts of the story until last:
‘He came out with like it came out over two or three days so you know….he’d say well I’ve something else to tell you …the bad stuff last….what hurt him most and what he’s saying what hurt him most’ (p. 92)
‘A parent described how her teenage son told her over a period of days’
And finally, one young person described how she told her social worker:
‘I couldn’t tell her most things but I just gave things to her to read… I told her at first I told her bits of it and em then just the others. I finished writing and then I gave them to her…. later I told her that it was the father as well.’ (p. 93)
This young person had been abused by both a father and son in a family with whom she was staying.
In reviewing the literature on this subject, London and colleagues (2005) noted, ‘when children do disclose, it often takes them a long time to do so’ (p. 204).
“When children do disclose, it often takes them a long time to do so”
Reasons for Patterns of Delay, Partial Disclosure and Non-disclosure
There are many influences on disclosure that have been identified in the research literature to help explain why it is that children delay disclosure, are reluctant to disclose, provide details of their experiences over time or do not disclose at all. Age has been identified as a significant predictor of disclosure in that younger children are less likely to disclose than older children. Children who are abused by a family member are less likely to disclose and more likely to delay disclosure than those abused by someone outside the family (Smith et al., 2000; Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Kogan, 2004). Children who do disclose during forensic interviews compared to children who do not disclose in such contexts (yet concerns remain that they have been abused) are more likely to have parents (particularly mothers) who are more supportive (Lawson and Chaffin, 1992). In Priebe and Svedin’s (2008) study of young people, parental bonding (positive relationship with parent who was not overprotective) was identified as the most significant predictor of disclosure for both boys and girls. However, close relationships can also act as an inhibitor to disclosure. McElvaney (2008) found that many young people in her study were reluctant to disclose due to concerns of upsetting their parents while others were concerned about the consequences for others of their disclosure. One 13-year-old girl described her concern that if she told, her uncle would go to jail and her small cousins would be left without a father:
‘I didn’t want them to grow up with no Dad and just looking at … their other little friends having their Dad holding their hand I felt like I was taking their Dad away from them’ (p. 130)
‘Younger children are less likely to disclose than older children’
‘Many young people in her study were reluctant to disclose due to concerns of upsetting their parents’
Gender has been found to influence disclosure in that boys appear to be more reluctant to disclose than girls (Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Hershkowitz et al., 2005; Ungar et al., 2009a). Mental health difficulties on the part of the child have also been found to be relevant, particularly when children experience dissociative symptoms or other post-traumatic stress symptomatology (Priebe and Svedin, 2008).
Some studies have found that the severity of abuse (e.g. penetrative abuse) predicts earlier disclosure while other studies have found no relationship between different types of abuse and disclosure timing. Similarly, the relationship between the duration of abuse – one-off incidents of abuse compared with abuse that takes place over a significant period of time – and timely disclosure has been investigated with mixed findings. Fear of the consequences of disclosure has been identified as a predictor of delayed disclosure and this in turn is associated with the age of the child (Goodman-Brown et al., 2003). Older children are more cognitively competent in terms of being able to reflect on and anticipate possible reactions to their disclosure. This can act then as an inhibitor to disclosure, although as noted above, most studies have found that older children are more likely to disclose than younger children. Fears of not being believed have been described by young people as inhibiting their disclosure and these fears are often justified. Hershkowitz et al. (2007) interviewed children about their initial disclosures prior to formal interview and 50 per cent of the sample (n = 30) reported feeling afraid or ashamed of their parents’ reaction. The authors reported that parents did show a tendency to blame their children and react angrily to the disclosure.
‘Fear of the consequences of disclosure has been identified as a predictor of delayed disclosure’
Recent research has highlighted the need for children to be asked direct questions to facilitate their disclosure. Of those children who did disclose, significant proportions disclosed following prompts rather than it being initiated by the child (Kogan, 2004). Qualitative studies drawing on interviews with children that focus on the disclosure process are important in investigating the precise circumstances that led to disclosures for children. McElvaney (2008) found that parents’ questioning of children was prompted by their concern about the young person’s emotional distress. On occasion, young people were communicating that something was not right in their world but were not able to articulate this verbally. Signs of psychological distress were, however, evident and questions targeted at the reasons for this distress were identified by McElvaney as a factor that helped young people to tell. Thus, many children may not have told about their experiences of abuse because they were not asked. McGee et al. (2002) followed up a sample of their respondents who had disclosed childhood abuse for the first time in their survey. When asked why they had not disclosed prior to the survey, many respondents noted that it was because they had not been asked. Increasingly, research studies are finding that significant proportions of disclosure have been prompted by questions by caregivers, friends or others in the child’s educational and social milieu that in themselves provide an opportunity for the young person to tell (Jensen et al., 2005; Hershkowitz et al., 2007; McElvaney et al., 2012).
‘Investigating the precise circumstances that led to disclosures for children’
‘Significant proportions of disclosure have been prompted by questions by caregivers, friends or others’
Finally, some children need time to tell. Mudaly and Goddard (2006) quote a 13-year-old girl: ‘she (mother) helped by not making me, not rushing me to get it out, which, um, I think it’s a really stupid idea to make kids get it out A.S.A.P.’ (p. 91).
Implications for Practice
The consensus in the research literature at the present time is that disclosure is multi-determined, influenced by a complex range of factors that may influence each child in a different way. Large-scale national probability studies confirm that non-disclosure and delays in disclosure are significant problems facing society and in particular for those professionals tasked with safeguarding the wellbeing of children. Children’s fears and anxieties in relation to telling need to be understood and contained by those in their environment so that early disclosure can be encouraged and facilitated.
The implications of these findings can be considered in interrelated contexts: the legal context where action can only be taken if the child is able to give a clear, credible account of his/her experiences; child protection and therapeutic contexts where a comprehensive account is required to enable child protection professionals to intervene and where the psychological sequelae can be addressed to minimise the long-term impact of the experiences; and family and community contexts where early disclosure needs to be encouraged, and other family issues addressed in the aftermath of disclosure and where peers play an important role.
‘The implications of these findings can be considered in interrelated contexts’
Studies have confirmed the importance of professionals asking children and young people in a sensitive, open manner about possible experiences of abuse using non-leading questioning styles to minimise inaccurate accounts or contaminate children’s narratives. It is clearly important for professionals to remain open to the possibility of abuse and further disclosure. It is equally important for professionals to be able to avoid persisting with questioning those children who are ‘reluctant disclosers’. Similarly, professionals engaged with children in therapeutic work need to be open to the possibility of both initial and further disclosures.
Contradiction in witness statements is a well-known feature of false statements and giving additional detail to original formal statements can be interpreted within child protection, therapeutic and legal contexts as a contradiction of an earlier account. Listening to children’s accounts of their experiences of disclosure helps us understand why it is that disclosure can be delayed and that when they do feel ready to tell this is not an ‘all or nothing’ decision. As one young person in Staller and Nelson-Gardell’s (2005) study noted, ‘it’s never finished, never’ p. 1426. This understanding in turn helps us identify those circumstances and reactions that may encourage the child to disclose.
‘Contradiction in witness statements is a well-known feature of false statements’
The importance of asking children questions, thus giving them an opportunity to tell, has been identified. While parents, teachers and those in daily contact with children are often reluctant to question children, it is clear that many children do not disclose unless given this opportunity. Education and increased awareness are needed on how to question children in an appropriate manner. McElvaney (2008) noted that questions did not need to be about sexual abuse per se, but rather questions prompted by the young person’s psychological distress, asking after the young people’s wellbeing. This questioning in effect acted as an external pressure for the young person to tell his/her secret (McElvaney et al., 2012). In Ungar et al.’s (2009a) study of Canadian youth, they found that young people used a range of disclosure strategies ranging from less direct strategies (such as risk-taking behaviours, not talking about the abuse) to direct strategies (such as seeking support from peers, turning to non-professional adult supports, disclosing to formal service providers), representing a process that relied heavily on others to ‘build the bridges between the youth and formal care providers’ (p. 352).
‘Education and increased awareness are needed on how to question children in an appropriate manner’
The tendency to delay disclosing and the partial nature of many disclosures are not conducive to successful legal investigations and prosecutions. In addition, the knowledge base that exists within the legal sphere is limited if only a percentage of the children who experience sexual abuse engage with this system. The disproportionately high ‘immediate disclosure’ rate found in Goodman-Brown et al.’s (2003) legal sample compared to Kogan’s (2004) community sample raises the question of the representation of delayed disclosers in the legal system. Are children who delay in disclosing less likely to engage with the legal system? Are delays in disclosing contributing to decisions not to prosecute child sexual abuse crimes? In Ireland, the 1990s saw a significant increase in the numbers of complainants coming before the courts reporting experiences of childhood sexual abuse. Many of these cases were referred to the higher courts for judicial review proceedings to establish whether the cases could proceed without prejudicing the accused given the delay in the complaint being made and giving due regard to the accused’s right to a speedy trial. Psychological expert testimony was sought as part of these proceedings to explain the delay in disclosure in each individual case to enable the courts to adjudicate on whether the delay in reporting was reasonable (see McElvaney, 2002). This legal mechanism provided an opportunity to enhance the knowledge base within the legal profession as to the complexities involved in disclosing and formally reporting experiences of childhood sexual abuse for adults. While one might expect that the legal system would be more sympathetic to children’s difficulties in making disclosures, it may also be the case that the belief that ‘if the child was really sexually abused, why would they not tell?’, as articulated by Summit (1983), still prevails.
‘Are children who delay in disclosing less likely to engage with the legal system?’
In addition, concerns that engagement with the legal system will lead to further psychological trauma need to be considered. A prospective longitudinal study conducted by Quas et al. (2005) indicated that the consequences of legal involvement change over the course of development and as a function of the child’s reactions to and experiences during the legal case. The associations between legal involvement and outcomes varied with age. The authors suggested that although younger children may be at increased risk for some adverse outcomes such as mental health problems, older children may be at increased risk for other undesirable sequelae such as the negative attitudes of others toward them. Quas and Goodman’s (2011) recent review notes that older children are more at risk in developing poor mental health outcomes. Thus, as noted earlier, young people’s fears of the consequences of disclosure may well be justified. Raised awareness of both the prevalence of non-disclosure of sexual abuse and the importance of supporting children to disclose may go some way to addressing children’s fears.
‘Concerns that engagement with the legal system will lead to further psychological trauma need to be considered’
One interesting finding in recent studies is that many young people who delayed disclosure to an adult had told a friend. McElvaney (2008) and Ungar et al. (2009b) identified peer influence as significant in encouraging disclosure among adolescents. There is some suggestion from the research that regardless of the age at the time of abuse, adolescence may be a ‘critical period’ for disclosure. It may be that targeting adolescents in general (rather than those at risk of abuse) may be a powerful prevention tool in encouraging early disclosure. Evaluations of child abuse prevention programmes have shown significant improvements in the levels of awareness of child abuse in children and young people (Rispers et al., 1997; Zwi et al., 2007). It may be that the increasing trend towards peer disclosure is a by-product of such educational and awareness-raising programmes. There is evidence that public awareness campaigns when implemented as part of a multi-dimensional strategy that involves targeting children, parents and communities (see Lalor and McElvaney, 2010, for a review of child abuse prevention programmes) are an effective tool in the prevention of child abuse.
‘Many young people who delayed disclosure to an adult had told a friend’
McElvaney et al. (2012) describe the importance for young people of containing the secret of abuse and their need for confidentiality following disclosure as representing an adaptive strategy on the part of the young person to contain the experience and his/her emotional reaction to it. The conflict between wanting/needing to keep the secret and wanting/needing to tell is mediated by what they term the ‘pressure cooker effect’. Young people in their study described influences from within and without that led to a build up of pressure, ultimately leading to disclosure. They suggest that building up the pressure for young people by providing opportunities to tell may be needed to help young people tell more promptly. However, the lack of control that young people experience following disclosure remains an issue (Ungar et al., 2009b; Quayle et al., 2012). This highlights the need for dissemination of information directly to young people about the legal process, the possible consequences of disclosure, as well as ongoing developments in legal proceedings when young people and their families interface with the legal system.
‘An adaptive strategy on the part of the young person to contain the experience’
The more recent focus on investigating those strategies that children use in making disclosures rather than solely on identifying barriers to disclosure is perhaps more helpful in informing awareness-raising campaigns and professional interventions. The author is involved in a large-scale review of children’s files in an assessment service to ascertain those factors that helped children tell about their experiences of sexual abuse. A pilot study has suggested that this is an appropriate methodology for gathering data on children’s experiences of informal disclosure, acknowledging the limitations of such an approach. Ungar et al. (2009a) describe the optimal conditions for disclosure as follows: being directly asked about experiences of abuse; having access to someone who will listen, believe and respond appropriately; having knowledge and language about what constitutes abuse and how to access help; having a sense of control over the process of disclosure both in terms of their anonymity (not being identified until they are ready for this) and confidentiality (the right to control who knows); and effective responses by adults both in informal and formal contexts.
‘More recent focus on investigating those strategies that children use in making disclosures’
‘Having a sense of control over the process of disclosure both in terms of their anonymity and confidentiality’
Ungar et al. (2009b) support recent developments in prevention programmes that target supportive formal and informal caregivers in being better able to detect the possibility of abuse and support disclosures rather than focusing on empowering children themselves in making disclosures. Their findings in relation to the importance of bridge building for young people to access formal supports are supported by Jensen et al.’s (2005) emphasis on the dialogical nature of disclosure, and the important role that trusted adults and peers play in the disclosure process through noticing signs of psychological distress and asking young people about their psychological wellbeing (Collings et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 2005; McElvaney et al., 2012). More emphasis is therefore needed on providing opportunities for children and young people to disclose. The challenge for professionals and those who care for children is how to do this in a way that protects children and promotes their wellbeing.
http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hamilton-Logo.jpg00SOL Reformhttp://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hamilton-Logo.jpgSOL Reform2013-06-26 20:12:042015-02-04 04:16:30McElvaney, R., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: Delays, Non-disclosure and Partial Disclosure. What the Research Tells Us and Implications for Practice. Child Abuse Rev.. doi: 10.1002/car.2280 (2013)
A law going into effect July 1 gives survivors of child sexual abuse seven years to report a crime or four years after the child leaves the care of the alleged perpetrator.
That is an increase from the previous two-year statute of limitations.
Monroe County Prosecutor Chris Gaal says after that time period, his office could not press charges.
Gaal says if child abuse survivors now have more time to report, prosecutors will have more opportunities to pursue a case.
“That’s a good reason for extending the statute of limitations so that we’re not having to decline prosecuting a case simply because there’s been delayed reporting, when in fact delayed reporting is a common thing that occurs in these types of child sex abuse cases,” Gaal says.
Heather Maritano is licensed social worker for Inner Resources Counseling in Bloomington. She says many victims take years to come forward because they are still dealing with the trauma and reporting can be especially difficult for young children.
“If you’re a two year old and you’re sexually abused you’re not really going to have the ability to be a good witness for yourself in a court case until you’re much older, so that two year window for younger victims is really detrimental,” Maritano says.
While this new law means it’s unlikely any physical evidence from the crime will still exist, Gaal says in most cases the most important evidence in a sexual abuse case is the victim’s testimony.
With more time to accept this testimony, he says the chances of conviction might be higher.
According to the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network or RAINN, fewer than 10 percent of reported sexual assaults are ever prosecuted.
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First Regular Session 118th General Assembly (2013)
PRINTING CODE. Amendments: Whenever an existing statute (or a section of the Indiana Constitution) is being amended, the text of the existing provision will appear in this style type, additions will appear in this style type, and deletions will appear in thisstyletype.
Additions: Whenever a new statutory provision is being enacted (or a new constitutional provision adopted), the text of the new provision will appear in this style type. Also, the word NEW will appear in that style type in the introductory clause of each SECTION that adds a new provision to the Indiana Code or the Indiana Constitution.
Conflict reconciliation: Text in a statute in this style type or thisstyletype reconciles conflicts between statutes enacted by the 2012 Regular Session of the General Assembly.
SENATE ENROLLED ACT No. 142
AN ACT to amend the Indiana Code concerning civil and criminal law and procedure.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana:
SOURCE: IC 34-11-2-4; (13)SE0142.1.1. –>
SECTION 1. IC 34-11-2-4 IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS [EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2013]: Sec. 4. (a) An action for:
(1) injury to person or character;
(2) injury to personal property; or
(3) a forfeiture of penalty given by statute;
must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues. (b) An action for injury to a person that results from the sexual abuse of a child must be commenced within the later of:
(1) seven (7) years after the cause of action accrues; or
(2) four (4) years after the person ceases to be a dependent of the person alleged to have performed the sexual abuse.
SOURCE: IC 35-41-4-2; (13)SE0142.1.2. –> SECTION 2. IC 35-41-4-2, AS AMENDED BY P.L.143-2009, SECTION 47, IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS [EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2013]: Sec. 2. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is commenced:
(1) within five (5) years after the commission of the offense, in the case of a Class B, Class C, or Class D felony; or
(2) within two (2) years after the commission of the offense, in the case of a misdemeanor.
(b) A prosecution for a Class B or Class C felony that would otherwise be barred under this section may be commenced within one(1) year after the earlier of the date on which the state:
(1) first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis; or
(2) could have discovered evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis by the exercise of due diligence.
(c) A prosecution for a Class A felony may be commenced at any time.
(d) A prosecution for murder may be commenced:
(1) at any time; and
(2) regardless of the amount of time that passes between:
(A) the date a person allegedly commits the elements of murder; and
(B) the date the alleged victim of the murder dies.
(e) A prosecution for the following offenses is barred unless commenced before the date that the alleged victim of the offense reaches thirty-one (31) years of age:
(1) IC 35-42-4-3(a) (Child molesting).
(2) IC 35-42-4-5 (Vicarious sexual gratification).
(3) IC 35-42-4-6 (Child solicitation).
(4) IC 35-42-4-7 (Child seduction).
(5) IC 35-46-1-3 (Incest).
(f) A prosecution for forgery of an instrument for payment of money, or for the uttering of a forged instrument, under IC 35-43-5-2, is barred unless it is commenced within five (5) years after the maturity of the instrument.
(g) If a complaint, indictment, or information is dismissed because of an error, defect, insufficiency, or irregularity, a new prosecution may be commenced within ninety (90) days after the dismissal even if the period of limitation has expired at the time of dismissal, or will expire within ninety (90) days after the dismissal.
(h) The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which:
(1) the accused person is not usually and publicly resident in Indiana or so conceals himself or herself that process cannot be served;
(2) the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence; or
(3) the accused person is a person elected or appointed to office under statute or constitution, if the offense charged is theft or
conversion of public funds or bribery while in public office.
(i) For purposes of tolling the period of limitation only, a prosecution is considered commenced on the earliest of these dates:
(1) The date of filing of an indictment, information, or complaint before a court having jurisdiction.
(2) The date of issuance of a valid arrest warrant.
(3) The date of arrest of the accused person by a law enforcement officer without a warrant, if the officer has authority to make the arrest.
(j) A prosecution is considered timely commenced for any offense to which the defendant enters a plea of guilty, notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.
(k) The following apply to the specified offenses:
(1) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-9-7(b) (misuse of funeral trust funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the settlor (as described in IC 30-2-9).
(2) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-10-9(b) (misuse of funeral trust funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the settlor (as described in IC 30-2-10).
(3) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-13-38(f) (misuse of funeral trust or escrow account funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the purchaser (as defined in IC 30-2-13-9).
(l) A prosecution for an offense under IC 23-14-48-9 is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the earlier of the date on which the state:
(1) first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense; or
(2) could have discovered evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense by the exercise of due diligence. (m) A prosecution for a sex offense listed in IC 11-8-8-4.5 that is committed against a child and that is not:
(1) a Class A felony; or
(2) listed in subsection (e);
is barred unless commenced within ten (10) years after the commission of the offense, or within four (4) years after the person ceases to be a dependent of the person alleged to have committed the offense, whichever occurs later.
SEA 142
Figure
Graphic file number 0 named seal1001.pcx with height 58 p and width 72 p Left aligned
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The national drive to identify and punish child predators took a step backward this week. While on its surface, the Supreme Court’s decision this week in Peugh v. United States does not deal with sex offenders, its impact will surely be felt in the sex-offender cases. As with the Court’s decision ten years ago in Stogner v. California, the Ex Post Facto Clause has once again been interpreted to make it more difficult to incarcerate criminals, and particularly sex offenders, as I will explain below.
Peugh involved a defendant who was convicted and sentenced on bank fraud counts. The defendant argued that his sentencing under the 2009 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were in effect at the time of sentencing, required a heavier sentence than the sentence he would have received at the time of the offense, which would have been governed by the 1998 Guidelines. Under the 1998 Guidelines, Peugh’s sentencing range would have been 30 to 37 months, but the 2009 Guidelines led to a range of 70 to 87 months, which was more than double the earlier calculation. The District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected his Ex Post Facto arguments and sentenced him to 70 months, but the Supreme Court agreed with him that the Clause had been violated. He won by a slim margin, with the Supreme Court ruling, 5-4, that the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes a sentence that is more severe than that which would have been likely to have been rendered at the time of the offense.
The Court split along its liberal and conservative divide, with Justice Kennedy, the typical swing vote, joining the majority and the liberals this time. They held that there was an Ex Post Facto violation here. The majority opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor, with Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joining. (Justice Kennedy joined all but section III-C, which was not critical to the holding, but laid out a broad constitutional policy theory that the Ex Post Facto Clause stands for fairness.) The five Justices in the majority agreed that it was substantially likely that the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines led to a lengthier sentence than the 1998 Guidelines, and, therefore, remanded the case for reconsideration of Peugh’s sentence.
While the decision and the dissent both delved into the factors found in Calder v. Bull and elsewhere, the majority’s rule boils down to the principle that a criminal defendant can only be subject to the law governing the substance of the crime and the sentence at the time of the offense, and that there is an Ex Post Facto Clause violation when there is a “substantial risk” that the sentence will be greater now than it was then.
The Peugh dissent was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito. The dissenters were not persuaded that the 2009 Guidelines required a lengthier sentence and they were correct in the sense that sentencing was discretionary to a degree in both eras. They reasoned that the newer Guidelines did nothing more than make the sentence more accurate in terms of the original goal of sentencing for the particular crime. They also emphasized the discretion that a District Judge could and should employ under either set of Guidelines. In their eyes, the judge had discretion, at the time of the offense, and still has discretion today, and the Guidelines do no more than move a judge toward the sentence that would have been most appropriate anyway. Thus, the dissenters would not have found an Ex Post Facto violation here.
The Peugh decision has special force in cases involving sex offenders, because the trend has been to increase prison terms for such crimes in recent years.
As state and federal legislatures have come to understand that many sex offenders are compulsive and, therefore, will be seriously dangerous long into the future, they have increased sentences for such offenses. This development has occurred at the same time that state and federal governments have instituted sex-offender registries to allow the public to identify dangerous sex offenders, whether they are in prison or not.
With the Peugh decision, sex-offender sentences must be guided by the governing sentence at the time of the offense, rather than by the increased sentence that would be imposed today. That means not only that there likely will be challenges by sex offenders to their sentences (which result in earlier release dates), but also that predators prosecuted in the future will be able to receive shorter sentences. This development also likely will affect plea deals, making it easier for defendants to argue from a stronger position for shorter sentences, which then often translate into lighter charges.
The 2003 Ex Post Facto Decision in Stogner v. California
A decade earlier, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause to preclude the revival of a criminal statute of limitations for child sex abuse in Stogner. The Court held there that in criminal cases, it is unconstitutional to revive the statute of limitations (SOL) after it had expired, based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, which only applies to criminal convictions. California had enacted legislation that retroactively revived both criminal and civil SOLs. Stogner solely addressed the criminal revival. Numerous decisions since then have upheld such revivals in the civil context.
Again, the Court lined up with its liberals in the majority, and its conservatives in dissent. At that time, though, the swing vote was Justice O’Connor. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined that opinion. Justice Kennedy actually wrote the dissent, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, and Thomas joining.
Justice Kennedy found in Stogner that the revival of an SOL did not change the crime or punishment at the time of the offense. He said, “A law which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime ‘greater than it was, when committed.’ Until today, a plea in bar has not been thought to form any part of the definition of the offense.”
He was correct: the SOL is only a deadline, not an alteration of legal substance or punishment and, therefore, the majority’s reasoning that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred such a revival was ill-considered. Kennedy’s movement from the dissent in Stogner to the majority in Peugh is explained by this distinction: he saw no change in substance or punishment in 2003 and ten years later in Peugh, he saw a change. That is consistent.
The Stogner majority opinionwas a major setback for victims of child sex abuse, because many states have had short SOLs and so many need decades to come forward. The result has been that they often miss the deadline for filing criminal charges. The Stogner decision thus shut the door on millions of victims definitively.
Since then, a number of states have extended or eliminated their criminal SOLs, but no state, due to Stogner, may revive an expired criminal SOL as California had. The bottom line is that we cannot incarcerate many child predators and we can only do so for shorter terms than we now would think are appropriate.
For compulsive pedophiles, this is a tremendous benefit and for our society, it poses more challenges regarding the protection of children. One thing is clear, though, if we are going to offer justice to millions of survivors, our only route is to revive their expired civil SOLs. For many, that is the only route available.
There is a bonus when more civil claims are filed, which is that once a victim comes forward, others are likely to as well. That means a victim from the past can lead the way in a civil suit for more recent victims who can now file criminal charges within statute. That is what happened with the priests and monsignor in the Philadelphia Archdiocese, where the 2005 Grand Jury Report,
included not a single case that was in statute, but it led to the 2011 Grand Jury Report, which did.
The need for such legislation is underscored even more by the ruling in Peugh, because we are going to have dangerous pedophiles leaving prison earlier than had been anticipated. Hopefully, they are on a reliable sex-offender registry so that the public knows of the danger they likely still pose, but, as we have learned, tracking predators through registries can be a challenge, and the announcement of a civil lawsuit is far more likely to get the public’s (and other victims’) attention. Thus, more than ever, victims who have yet to come forward need to have a chance to file civil suits. Their doing so will send a signal to the silent current or recent victims whose criminal SOLs have not yet expired. In sum, the civil suit can trigger the prosecution needed to protect society from these repeat predators, and to protect children and provide them with justice. Therefore, civil SOLs need to be enacted that permit revival of expired civil claims, as they have in numerous states, and both criminal and civil SOLs need to be eliminated.
That is the child protection lesson of the Supreme Court’s Ex Post Facto jurisprudence.
– See more at: http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/14/the-supreme-court-renders-another-decision-interpreting-the-ex-post-facto-clause#sthash.c4nSsYiZ.dpuf
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Rev. Michael Fugee is a New Jersey priest who was put on trial for sexually assaulting a 14-year-old boy, and later confessed to fondling the child while he was under his care… twice.
Fugee was convicted, but that conviction was later overturned by an appeals court. Instead of a retrial, Fugee was allowed to sign a binding agreement not to work with or around children. Unsurprisingly, he was arrested last month after it was revealed he attended weekend youth retreats on behalf of St. Mary’s Parish in Colts Neck.
Now, there’s no indication Fugee engaged in this type of behavior this time around, but what if he did? And what if those victims, traumatized by shame and humiliation, weren’t able to muster the strength to come forward for many years?
Well, they’d be out of luck in New Jersey, and the Catholic Church is spending lots of money to keep it that way.
Currently, the statute of limitations for a victim of child-abuse in the state isn’t ten years or even five years. It’s two years. If abuse victims don’t come forward within two years of their 18th birthday, they’re out of luck, which puts us way out of step with neighboring states. In New York, victims have until they turn 23 to file suit. In Pennsylvania and Connecticut, they have until they’re 30. Delaware doesn’t even have a limit.
State Sen. Joseph Vitale (D-19th) wants to do something about that. He is sponsoring legislation that would extend the window for statute of limitations for sexual abuse victims to 30 years.
“Protect the child molesters” doesn’t appear anywhere in the Bible that I know of, but the New Jersey Catholic Conference seems to be acting like it does, hiring the most expensive and powerful lobbying firm in Trenton, Princeton Public Affairs, to fight against Vitale’s bill
This isn’t a New Jersey-specific issue. The Catholic Church has been active in pushing back proposals that lengthen the time allowed for victims of alleged abuse to come forward. And in addition to New Jersey, high-priced lobbyists have been hired in Colorado and New York to fight similar attempts.
There position isn’t about protecting kids. It isn’t even as much about protecting priests anymore. It’s about money, pure and simple. Since the first instance of child abuse came to light, the Catholic Church has spent $2.5 billion on legal fees, settlements and prevention efforts related to sexual abuse.
We know that it’s not easy for some victims to come forward. Mike Crawford was only 13 when he said his priest fondled him. He wasn’t able to muster the strength to tell anyone until his early adulthood, which made it too late to prosecute. He now heads the New Jersey chapter of the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, and has been an outspoken advocate of extending the statute of limitations in New Jersey.
It seems to make common sense to anyone that doesn’t wear a frock and molest little kids. By extending the window for victims to come forward, we’d be allowing a judge, not a priest, to look at the evidence, review the relevant facts, and make a judgment as each individual case warrants it
“People deserve their day in court,” Crawford said, and I couldn’t agree more. After all, the Bible calls for the death penalty for child molesters, saying “it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.”
No one is calling for that. All we want is for victims to be heard. Is that too much to ask?
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“This is it! SB 131, the Child Victims Act in CA, will receive its hearing in the Assembly Judiciary Committee on June 18th. Please help pass this bill to bring justice to me and other survivors of abuse. Please call and write to CA Assembly Judiciary Committee members and ask them to vote YES on SB 131 to stop child rapists and those who protect them. Please share this information and ask others to do the same!
McElvaney, R., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: Delays, Non-disclosure and Partial Disclosure. What the Research Tells Us and Implications for Practice. Child Abuse Rev.. doi: 10.1002/car.2280 (2013)
/in Delay, Delay, Resources, Resources: Delay /by SOL ReformFirst published:
Correspondence to: Rosaleen McElvaney, School of Nursing and Human Sciences, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin 9, Ireland. E-mail: rosaleen.mcelvaney@dcu.ie
Abstract
KEY PRACTITIONER MESSAGES
The research to date on disclosure patterns is based on two sampling methodologies – studies of adults reporting retrospective experiences and studies of children. The former group of studies has the benefit of drawing on large-scale national probability samples which can be considered to be representative of the general population. The latter group with some small exceptions (predominantly adolescent studies) uses samples of young people who have disclosed sexual abuse but would not be considered as representative of all children who have been abused:
Patterns of Disclosure: Delays and Non-disclosure
There is consensus in the research literature that most people who experience sexual abuse in childhood do not disclose this abuse until adulthood, and when disclosure does occur in childhood, significant delays are common. Table 1 summarises two large-scale studies to highlight the extent of delays in disclosure and the percentage of those who did not disclose to anyone prior to the study.
Kogan (2004) examined the timing of disclosure of unwanted sexual experiences in childhood or adolescence in a sub-sample (n = 263 adolescent women, aged 12 to 17) of the National Survey of Adolescents (Kilpatrick and Saunders, 1995) in the USA – a nationally representative study. Kogan’s results can be summarised as follows: immediate disclosure (within 1 month) 43 per cent, delayed disclosure (less than 1 year) 31 per cent and non-disclosure (disclosed only during the survey) 26 per cent. Smith and colleagues (2000) examined a sub-sample (n = 288) of the National Women’s Study in the USA (Resnick et al., 1993, cited in Smith et al., 2000) who had reported a childhood rape prior to the age of 18. Smith et al.’s findings can be summarised as follows: immediate disclosure (within 1 month) 27 per cent, delayed disclosure (more than a year) 58 per cent and non-disclosure (survey only) 28 per cent. Those who had never disclosed prior to the survey constitute comparable proportions in these two studies while the rates for immediate disclosure are higher in the adolescent study than in the adult study, a reassuring finding given the increased awareness of sexual abuse in society during the past 20 years.
Goodman-Brown and colleagues (2003) examined USA district attorney files of 218 children. Their categories were slightly different from the previous two studies but in summary, immediate disclosers (within 1 month) constituted 64 per cent of the sample while 29 per cent disclosed within six months. This study is unusual insofar as the sample studied had reported their experience of abuse to the authorities and a prosecution was in progress. Goodman-Brown et al. also pointed out that families who participated in this study were more likely to represent those children who experienced abuse by someone outside the family. Research has found that delays in disclosure are longer for those abused within the family (Sjoberg and Lindblad, 2002; Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Kogan, 2004; Hershkowitz et al., 2005). Therefore, children who disclose more promptly may be overrepresented in legal samples.
In Sweden, Priebe and Svedin (2008) conducted a national survey of 4339 adolescents, of whom 1962 reported some form of sexual abuse (65% of girls and 23% of boys). Details of the time lapse in disclosing were not available from this study. However, of those who had disclosed and answered the questions on disclosure (n = 1493), 59.5 per cent had told no-one of their experiences prior to the survey. Of those who did disclose, 80.5 per cent mentioned a ‘friend of my own age’ as the only person who they had told. In this study, 6.8 per cent had reported their experiences to the social authorities or police. A further Swedish study of 122 women who had experienced childhood sexual abuse (Jonson and Lindblad, 2004) found that 32 per cent disclosed during childhood (before the age of 18) while the majority told in adulthood (68%). The delay was up to 49 years, with an average of 21 years (SD = 12.9). Of those who told in childhood, 59 per cent told only one person. In Ireland, the SAVI study (n = 3118, McGee et al., 2002) found that 47 per cent of those respondents who had experienced some form of sexual assault prior to age 17 had told no-one of this experience until the survey. McElvaney (2002) investigated delay in a legal sample of ten adults who had made formal complaints of childhood sexual abuse in Ireland and found delays ranging from 20 years to 50 years.
Studies of children in the context of forensic/investigative interviews where children are interviewed by professionals due to concerns that the child has been sexually abused also point to high non-disclosure rates, particularly striking in cases where there is corroborative evidence that abuse has occurred – medical evidence (Lyon, 2007), or confessions from the abuser or videotaped evidence/witness reports (Sjoberg and Lindblad, 2002). Lyon (2007) reported his findings from a review of studies published between 1965 and 1993 of children diagnosed with gonorrhoea where the average disclosure rate among 579 children was 43 per cent (n = 250). In a study where the evidence for the abuse was available on videotape, children have denied abuse when interviewed by the police (Sjoberg and Lindblad, 2002).
In summary, significant numbers of children do not disclose experiences of sexual abuse until adulthood and adult survey results suggest that significant proportions of adults have never disclosed such abuse, as evidenced by the high numbers of respondents disclosing to researchers for the first time.
Patterns of Disclosure – Partial Disclosure
Information on how children disclose over time can be obtained from studies of children who participated in forensic/investigative interviews where children are interviewed by professionals due to concerns that the child has been sexually abused. The issue of partial disclosures was highlighted by earlier studies such as those by DeVoe and Faller (1999) of five- to ten-year olds (i.e. making detailed informal disclosures that were not replicated in formal interviews) and Elliott and Briere (1994) of children aged eight to 15 years (i.e. disclosing only partial information until confronted with external evidence that led to more complete disclosures).
More recently, investigators have examined the role of the interviewer and questioning styles in the forensic interview and how this impacts on children’s disclosures and the level of detail provided in interview. Hershkowitz et al. (2006) compared tapes of interviews with children who disclosed sexual abuse and those who did not (but about whom there was ‘substantial’ reason to believe that they had been abused). They found that interviewers behaved differently with the two groups, using different types of prompts with children who presented as somewhat uncooperative, offered fewer details and gave more uninformative responses at the beginning of the interview. It would appear that interviewers responded to less communicative children by increasing the proportion of closed questions which in turn led to children being less forthcoming. Lamb et al. (2002) have found that the use of a protocol that emphasises the use of prompts that elicit free narrative (e.g. ‘tell me about that’) as compared with closed questions (those requiring a yes/no response) has resulted in more detail and more accuracy in children’s accounts.
Although few studies exist that examine the phenomenon of disclosure in informal settings (when disclosure is made to a friend or family member), some qualitative studies have described this process. McElvaney (2008) quoted one teenage girl who described hinting to her mother prior to disclosing the experience: ‘I didn’t tell her what happened but I was saying things that made her think it made her think that it happened but I didn’t tell her’ (p. 127). A parent described how her teenage son told her over a period of days, keeping the most difficult parts of the story until last:
And finally, one young person described how she told her social worker:
This young person had been abused by both a father and son in a family with whom she was staying.
In reviewing the literature on this subject, London and colleagues (2005) noted, ‘when children do disclose, it often takes them a long time to do so’ (p. 204).
Reasons for Patterns of Delay, Partial Disclosure and Non-disclosure
There are many influences on disclosure that have been identified in the research literature to help explain why it is that children delay disclosure, are reluctant to disclose, provide details of their experiences over time or do not disclose at all. Age has been identified as a significant predictor of disclosure in that younger children are less likely to disclose than older children. Children who are abused by a family member are less likely to disclose and more likely to delay disclosure than those abused by someone outside the family (Smith et al., 2000; Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Kogan, 2004). Children who do disclose during forensic interviews compared to children who do not disclose in such contexts (yet concerns remain that they have been abused) are more likely to have parents (particularly mothers) who are more supportive (Lawson and Chaffin, 1992). In Priebe and Svedin’s (2008) study of young people, parental bonding (positive relationship with parent who was not overprotective) was identified as the most significant predictor of disclosure for both boys and girls. However, close relationships can also act as an inhibitor to disclosure. McElvaney (2008) found that many young people in her study were reluctant to disclose due to concerns of upsetting their parents while others were concerned about the consequences for others of their disclosure. One 13-year-old girl described her concern that if she told, her uncle would go to jail and her small cousins would be left without a father:
Gender has been found to influence disclosure in that boys appear to be more reluctant to disclose than girls (Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Hershkowitz et al., 2005; Ungar et al., 2009a). Mental health difficulties on the part of the child have also been found to be relevant, particularly when children experience dissociative symptoms or other post-traumatic stress symptomatology (Priebe and Svedin, 2008).
Some studies have found that the severity of abuse (e.g. penetrative abuse) predicts earlier disclosure while other studies have found no relationship between different types of abuse and disclosure timing. Similarly, the relationship between the duration of abuse – one-off incidents of abuse compared with abuse that takes place over a significant period of time – and timely disclosure has been investigated with mixed findings. Fear of the consequences of disclosure has been identified as a predictor of delayed disclosure and this in turn is associated with the age of the child (Goodman-Brown et al., 2003). Older children are more cognitively competent in terms of being able to reflect on and anticipate possible reactions to their disclosure. This can act then as an inhibitor to disclosure, although as noted above, most studies have found that older children are more likely to disclose than younger children. Fears of not being believed have been described by young people as inhibiting their disclosure and these fears are often justified. Hershkowitz et al. (2007) interviewed children about their initial disclosures prior to formal interview and 50 per cent of the sample (n = 30) reported feeling afraid or ashamed of their parents’ reaction. The authors reported that parents did show a tendency to blame their children and react angrily to the disclosure.
Recent research has highlighted the need for children to be asked direct questions to facilitate their disclosure. Of those children who did disclose, significant proportions disclosed following prompts rather than it being initiated by the child (Kogan, 2004). Qualitative studies drawing on interviews with children that focus on the disclosure process are important in investigating the precise circumstances that led to disclosures for children. McElvaney (2008) found that parents’ questioning of children was prompted by their concern about the young person’s emotional distress. On occasion, young people were communicating that something was not right in their world but were not able to articulate this verbally. Signs of psychological distress were, however, evident and questions targeted at the reasons for this distress were identified by McElvaney as a factor that helped young people to tell. Thus, many children may not have told about their experiences of abuse because they were not asked. McGee et al. (2002) followed up a sample of their respondents who had disclosed childhood abuse for the first time in their survey. When asked why they had not disclosed prior to the survey, many respondents noted that it was because they had not been asked. Increasingly, research studies are finding that significant proportions of disclosure have been prompted by questions by caregivers, friends or others in the child’s educational and social milieu that in themselves provide an opportunity for the young person to tell (Jensen et al., 2005; Hershkowitz et al., 2007; McElvaney et al., 2012).
Finally, some children need time to tell. Mudaly and Goddard (2006) quote a 13-year-old girl: ‘she (mother) helped by not making me, not rushing me to get it out, which, um, I think it’s a really stupid idea to make kids get it out A.S.A.P.’ (p. 91).
Implications for Practice
The consensus in the research literature at the present time is that disclosure is multi-determined, influenced by a complex range of factors that may influence each child in a different way. Large-scale national probability studies confirm that non-disclosure and delays in disclosure are significant problems facing society and in particular for those professionals tasked with safeguarding the wellbeing of children. Children’s fears and anxieties in relation to telling need to be understood and contained by those in their environment so that early disclosure can be encouraged and facilitated.
The implications of these findings can be considered in interrelated contexts: the legal context where action can only be taken if the child is able to give a clear, credible account of his/her experiences; child protection and therapeutic contexts where a comprehensive account is required to enable child protection professionals to intervene and where the psychological sequelae can be addressed to minimise the long-term impact of the experiences; and family and community contexts where early disclosure needs to be encouraged, and other family issues addressed in the aftermath of disclosure and where peers play an important role.
Studies have confirmed the importance of professionals asking children and young people in a sensitive, open manner about possible experiences of abuse using non-leading questioning styles to minimise inaccurate accounts or contaminate children’s narratives. It is clearly important for professionals to remain open to the possibility of abuse and further disclosure. It is equally important for professionals to be able to avoid persisting with questioning those children who are ‘reluctant disclosers’. Similarly, professionals engaged with children in therapeutic work need to be open to the possibility of both initial and further disclosures.
Contradiction in witness statements is a well-known feature of false statements and giving additional detail to original formal statements can be interpreted within child protection, therapeutic and legal contexts as a contradiction of an earlier account. Listening to children’s accounts of their experiences of disclosure helps us understand why it is that disclosure can be delayed and that when they do feel ready to tell this is not an ‘all or nothing’ decision. As one young person in Staller and Nelson-Gardell’s (2005) study noted, ‘it’s never finished, never’ p. 1426. This understanding in turn helps us identify those circumstances and reactions that may encourage the child to disclose.
The importance of asking children questions, thus giving them an opportunity to tell, has been identified. While parents, teachers and those in daily contact with children are often reluctant to question children, it is clear that many children do not disclose unless given this opportunity. Education and increased awareness are needed on how to question children in an appropriate manner. McElvaney (2008) noted that questions did not need to be about sexual abuse per se, but rather questions prompted by the young person’s psychological distress, asking after the young people’s wellbeing. This questioning in effect acted as an external pressure for the young person to tell his/her secret (McElvaney et al., 2012). In Ungar et al.’s (2009a) study of Canadian youth, they found that young people used a range of disclosure strategies ranging from less direct strategies (such as risk-taking behaviours, not talking about the abuse) to direct strategies (such as seeking support from peers, turning to non-professional adult supports, disclosing to formal service providers), representing a process that relied heavily on others to ‘build the bridges between the youth and formal care providers’ (p. 352).
The tendency to delay disclosing and the partial nature of many disclosures are not conducive to successful legal investigations and prosecutions. In addition, the knowledge base that exists within the legal sphere is limited if only a percentage of the children who experience sexual abuse engage with this system. The disproportionately high ‘immediate disclosure’ rate found in Goodman-Brown et al.’s (2003) legal sample compared to Kogan’s (2004) community sample raises the question of the representation of delayed disclosers in the legal system. Are children who delay in disclosing less likely to engage with the legal system? Are delays in disclosing contributing to decisions not to prosecute child sexual abuse crimes? In Ireland, the 1990s saw a significant increase in the numbers of complainants coming before the courts reporting experiences of childhood sexual abuse. Many of these cases were referred to the higher courts for judicial review proceedings to establish whether the cases could proceed without prejudicing the accused given the delay in the complaint being made and giving due regard to the accused’s right to a speedy trial. Psychological expert testimony was sought as part of these proceedings to explain the delay in disclosure in each individual case to enable the courts to adjudicate on whether the delay in reporting was reasonable (see McElvaney, 2002). This legal mechanism provided an opportunity to enhance the knowledge base within the legal profession as to the complexities involved in disclosing and formally reporting experiences of childhood sexual abuse for adults. While one might expect that the legal system would be more sympathetic to children’s difficulties in making disclosures, it may also be the case that the belief that ‘if the child was really sexually abused, why would they not tell?’, as articulated by Summit (1983), still prevails.
In addition, concerns that engagement with the legal system will lead to further psychological trauma need to be considered. A prospective longitudinal study conducted by Quas et al. (2005) indicated that the consequences of legal involvement change over the course of development and as a function of the child’s reactions to and experiences during the legal case. The associations between legal involvement and outcomes varied with age. The authors suggested that although younger children may be at increased risk for some adverse outcomes such as mental health problems, older children may be at increased risk for other undesirable sequelae such as the negative attitudes of others toward them. Quas and Goodman’s (2011) recent review notes that older children are more at risk in developing poor mental health outcomes. Thus, as noted earlier, young people’s fears of the consequences of disclosure may well be justified. Raised awareness of both the prevalence of non-disclosure of sexual abuse and the importance of supporting children to disclose may go some way to addressing children’s fears.
One interesting finding in recent studies is that many young people who delayed disclosure to an adult had told a friend. McElvaney (2008) and Ungar et al. (2009b) identified peer influence as significant in encouraging disclosure among adolescents. There is some suggestion from the research that regardless of the age at the time of abuse, adolescence may be a ‘critical period’ for disclosure. It may be that targeting adolescents in general (rather than those at risk of abuse) may be a powerful prevention tool in encouraging early disclosure. Evaluations of child abuse prevention programmes have shown significant improvements in the levels of awareness of child abuse in children and young people (Rispers et al., 1997; Zwi et al., 2007). It may be that the increasing trend towards peer disclosure is a by-product of such educational and awareness-raising programmes. There is evidence that public awareness campaigns when implemented as part of a multi-dimensional strategy that involves targeting children, parents and communities (see Lalor and McElvaney, 2010, for a review of child abuse prevention programmes) are an effective tool in the prevention of child abuse.
McElvaney et al. (2012) describe the importance for young people of containing the secret of abuse and their need for confidentiality following disclosure as representing an adaptive strategy on the part of the young person to contain the experience and his/her emotional reaction to it. The conflict between wanting/needing to keep the secret and wanting/needing to tell is mediated by what they term the ‘pressure cooker effect’. Young people in their study described influences from within and without that led to a build up of pressure, ultimately leading to disclosure. They suggest that building up the pressure for young people by providing opportunities to tell may be needed to help young people tell more promptly. However, the lack of control that young people experience following disclosure remains an issue (Ungar et al., 2009b; Quayle et al., 2012). This highlights the need for dissemination of information directly to young people about the legal process, the possible consequences of disclosure, as well as ongoing developments in legal proceedings when young people and their families interface with the legal system.
The more recent focus on investigating those strategies that children use in making disclosures rather than solely on identifying barriers to disclosure is perhaps more helpful in informing awareness-raising campaigns and professional interventions. The author is involved in a large-scale review of children’s files in an assessment service to ascertain those factors that helped children tell about their experiences of sexual abuse. A pilot study has suggested that this is an appropriate methodology for gathering data on children’s experiences of informal disclosure, acknowledging the limitations of such an approach. Ungar et al. (2009a) describe the optimal conditions for disclosure as follows: being directly asked about experiences of abuse; having access to someone who will listen, believe and respond appropriately; having knowledge and language about what constitutes abuse and how to access help; having a sense of control over the process of disclosure both in terms of their anonymity (not being identified until they are ready for this) and confidentiality (the right to control who knows); and effective responses by adults both in informal and formal contexts.
Ungar et al. (2009b) support recent developments in prevention programmes that target supportive formal and informal caregivers in being better able to detect the possibility of abuse and support disclosures rather than focusing on empowering children themselves in making disclosures. Their findings in relation to the importance of bridge building for young people to access formal supports are supported by Jensen et al.’s (2005) emphasis on the dialogical nature of disclosure, and the important role that trusted adults and peers play in the disclosure process through noticing signs of psychological distress and asking young people about their psychological wellbeing (Collings et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 2005; McElvaney et al., 2012). More emphasis is therefore needed on providing opportunities for children and young people to disclose. The challenge for professionals and those who care for children is how to do this in a way that protects children and promotes their wellbeing.
Indiana Law Gives More Time To Report Child Sexual Abuse
/in Indiana /by SOL ReformA law going into effect July 1 gives survivors of child sexual abuse seven years to report a crime or four years after the child leaves the care of the alleged perpetrator.
That is an increase from the previous two-year statute of limitations.
Monroe County Prosecutor Chris Gaal says after that time period, his office could not press charges.
Gaal says if child abuse survivors now have more time to report, prosecutors will have more opportunities to pursue a case.
“That’s a good reason for extending the statute of limitations so that we’re not having to decline prosecuting a case simply because there’s been delayed reporting, when in fact delayed reporting is a common thing that occurs in these types of child sex abuse cases,” Gaal says.
Heather Maritano is licensed social worker for Inner Resources Counseling in Bloomington. She says many victims take years to come forward because they are still dealing with the trauma and reporting can be especially difficult for young children.
“If you’re a two year old and you’re sexually abused you’re not really going to have the ability to be a good witness for yourself in a court case until you’re much older, so that two year window for younger victims is really detrimental,” Maritano says.
While this new law means it’s unlikely any physical evidence from the crime will still exist, Gaal says in most cases the most important evidence in a sexual abuse case is the victim’s testimony.
With more time to accept this testimony, he says the chances of conviction might be higher.
According to the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network or RAINN, fewer than 10 percent of reported sexual assaults are ever prosecuted.
By A.J. BRAMMER
Source: http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/law-time-report-child-sexual-abuse-50894/
IN improves its civil SOL. Good step forward but much more needs to be done.
/in Indiana /by SOL ReformPRINTING CODE. Amendments: Whenever an existing statute (or a section of the Indiana Constitution) is being amended, the text of the existing provision will appear in this style type, additions will appear in this style type, and deletions will appear in thisstyle type.
Additions: Whenever a new statutory provision is being enacted (or a new constitutional provision adopted), the text of the new provision will appear in this style type. Also, the word NEW will appear in that style type in the introductory clause of each SECTION that adds a new provision to the Indiana Code or the Indiana Constitution.
Conflict reconciliation: Text in a statute in this style type or this style type reconciles conflicts between statutes enacted by the 2012 Regular Session of the General Assembly.
AN ACT to amend the Indiana Code concerning civil and criminal law and procedure.
(1) injury to person or character;
(2) injury to personal property; or
(3) a forfeiture of penalty given by statute;
must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.
(b) An action for injury to a person that results from the sexual abuse of a child must be commenced within the later of:
(1) seven (7) years after the cause of action accrues; or
(2) four (4) years after the person ceases to be a dependent of the person alleged to have performed the sexual abuse.
(1) within five (5) years after the commission of the offense, in the case of a Class B, Class C, or Class D felony; or
(2) within two (2) years after the commission of the offense, in the case of a misdemeanor.
(b) A prosecution for a Class B or Class C felony that would otherwise be barred under this section may be commenced within one(1) year after the earlier of the date on which the state:
(1) first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis; or
(2) could have discovered evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense through DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis by the exercise of due diligence.
(c) A prosecution for a Class A felony may be commenced at any time.
(d) A prosecution for murder may be commenced:
(1) at any time; and
(2) regardless of the amount of time that passes between:
(A) the date a person allegedly commits the elements of murder; and
(B) the date the alleged victim of the murder dies.
(e) A prosecution for the following offenses is barred unless commenced before the date that the alleged victim of the offense reaches thirty-one (31) years of age:
(1) IC 35-42-4-3(a) (Child molesting).
(2) IC 35-42-4-5 (Vicarious sexual gratification).
(3) IC 35-42-4-6 (Child solicitation).
(4) IC 35-42-4-7 (Child seduction).
(5) IC 35-46-1-3 (Incest).
(f) A prosecution for forgery of an instrument for payment of money, or for the uttering of a forged instrument, under IC 35-43-5-2, is barred unless it is commenced within five (5) years after the maturity of the instrument.
(g) If a complaint, indictment, or information is dismissed because of an error, defect, insufficiency, or irregularity, a new prosecution may be commenced within ninety (90) days after the dismissal even if the period of limitation has expired at the time of dismissal, or will expire within ninety (90) days after the dismissal.
(h) The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which:
(1) the accused person is not usually and publicly resident in Indiana or so conceals himself or herself that process cannot be served;
(2) the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence; or
(3) the accused person is a person elected or appointed to office under statute or constitution, if the offense charged is theft or
conversion of public funds or bribery while in public office.
(i) For purposes of tolling the period of limitation only, a prosecution is considered commenced on the earliest of these dates:
(1) The date of filing of an indictment, information, or complaint before a court having jurisdiction.
(2) The date of issuance of a valid arrest warrant.
(3) The date of arrest of the accused person by a law enforcement officer without a warrant, if the officer has authority to make the arrest.
(j) A prosecution is considered timely commenced for any offense to which the defendant enters a plea of guilty, notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.
(k) The following apply to the specified offenses:
(1) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-9-7(b) (misuse of funeral trust funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the settlor (as described in IC 30-2-9).
(2) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-10-9(b) (misuse of funeral trust funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the settlor (as described in IC 30-2-10).
(3) A prosecution for an offense under IC 30-2-13-38(f) (misuse of funeral trust or escrow account funds) is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the date of death of the purchaser (as defined in IC 30-2-13-9).
(l) A prosecution for an offense under IC 23-14-48-9 is barred unless commenced within five (5) years after the earlier of the date on which the state:
(1) first discovers evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense; or
(2) could have discovered evidence sufficient to charge the offender with the offense by the exercise of due diligence.
(m) A prosecution for a sex offense listed in IC 11-8-8-4.5 that is committed against a child and that is not:
(1) a Class A felony; or
(2) listed in subsection (e);
is barred unless commenced within ten (10) years after the commission of the offense, or within four (4) years after the person ceases to be a dependent of the person alleged to have committed the offense, whichever occurs later.
Graphic file number 0 named seal1001.pcx with height 58 p and width 72 p Left aligned
Supreme Court decision makes case for civil window and sol reform
/in Uncategorized /by SOL ReformThe national drive to identify and punish child predators took a step backward this week. While on its surface, the Supreme Court’s decision this week in Peugh v. United States does not deal with sex offenders, its impact will surely be felt in the sex-offender cases. As with the Court’s decision ten years ago in Stogner v. California, the Ex Post Facto Clause has once again been interpreted to make it more difficult to incarcerate criminals, and particularly sex offenders, as I will explain below.
Peugh involved a defendant who was convicted and sentenced on bank fraud counts. The defendant argued that his sentencing under the 2009 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were in effect at the time of sentencing, required a heavier sentence than the sentence he would have received at the time of the offense, which would have been governed by the 1998 Guidelines. Under the 1998 Guidelines, Peugh’s sentencing range would have been 30 to 37 months, but the 2009 Guidelines led to a range of 70 to 87 months, which was more than double the earlier calculation. The District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected his Ex Post Facto arguments and sentenced him to 70 months, but the Supreme Court agreed with him that the Clause had been violated. He won by a slim margin, with the Supreme Court ruling, 5-4, that the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes a sentence that is more severe than that which would have been likely to have been rendered at the time of the offense.
The Court split along its liberal and conservative divide, with Justice Kennedy, the typical swing vote, joining the majority and the liberals this time. They held that there was an Ex Post Facto violation here. The majority opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor, with Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joining. (Justice Kennedy joined all but section III-C, which was not critical to the holding, but laid out a broad constitutional policy theory that the Ex Post Facto Clause stands for fairness.) The five Justices in the majority agreed that it was substantially likely that the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines led to a lengthier sentence than the 1998 Guidelines, and, therefore, remanded the case for reconsideration of Peugh’s sentence.
While the decision and the dissent both delved into the factors found in Calder v. Bull and elsewhere, the majority’s rule boils down to the principle that a criminal defendant can only be subject to the law governing the substance of the crime and the sentence at the time of the offense, and that there is an Ex Post Facto Clause violation when there is a “substantial risk” that the sentence will be greater now than it was then.
The Peugh dissent was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito. The dissenters were not persuaded that the 2009 Guidelines required a lengthier sentence and they were correct in the sense that sentencing was discretionary to a degree in both eras. They reasoned that the newer Guidelines did nothing more than make the sentence more accurate in terms of the original goal of sentencing for the particular crime. They also emphasized the discretion that a District Judge could and should employ under either set of Guidelines. In their eyes, the judge had discretion, at the time of the offense, and still has discretion today, and the Guidelines do no more than move a judge toward the sentence that would have been most appropriate anyway. Thus, the dissenters would not have found an Ex Post Facto violation here.
The Peugh decision has special force in cases involving sex offenders, because the trend has been to increase prison terms for such crimes in recent years.
As state and federal legislatures have come to understand that many sex offenders are compulsive and, therefore, will be seriously dangerous long into the future, they have increased sentences for such offenses. This development has occurred at the same time that state and federal governments have instituted sex-offender registries to allow the public to identify dangerous sex offenders, whether they are in prison or not.
With the Peugh decision, sex-offender sentences must be guided by the governing sentence at the time of the offense, rather than by the increased sentence that would be imposed today. That means not only that there likely will be challenges by sex offenders to their sentences (which result in earlier release dates), but also that predators prosecuted in the future will be able to receive shorter sentences. This development also likely will affect plea deals, making it easier for defendants to argue from a stronger position for shorter sentences, which then often translate into lighter charges.
The 2003 Ex Post Facto Decision in Stogner v. California
A decade earlier, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause to preclude the revival of a criminal statute of limitations for child sex abuse in Stogner. The Court held there that in criminal cases, it is unconstitutional to revive the statute of limitations (SOL) after it had expired, based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, which only applies to criminal convictions. California had enacted legislation that retroactively revived both criminal and civil SOLs. Stogner solely addressed the criminal revival. Numerous decisions since then have upheld such revivals in the civil context.
Again, the Court lined up with its liberals in the majority, and its conservatives in dissent. At that time, though, the swing vote was Justice O’Connor. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined that opinion. Justice Kennedy actually wrote the dissent, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, and Thomas joining.
Justice Kennedy found in Stogner that the revival of an SOL did not change the crime or punishment at the time of the offense. He said, “A law which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime ‘greater than it was, when committed.’ Until today, a plea in bar has not been thought to form any part of the definition of the offense.”
He was correct: the SOL is only a deadline, not an alteration of legal substance or punishment and, therefore, the majority’s reasoning that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred such a revival was ill-considered. Kennedy’s movement from the dissent in Stogner to the majority in Peugh is explained by this distinction: he saw no change in substance or punishment in 2003 and ten years later in Peugh, he saw a change. That is consistent.
The Stogner majority opinion was a major setback for victims of child sex abuse, because many states have had short SOLs and so many need decades to come forward. The result has been that they often miss the deadline for filing criminal charges. The Stogner decision thus shut the door on millions of victims definitively.
Since then, a number of states have extended or eliminated their criminal SOLs, but no state, due to Stogner, may revive an expired criminal SOL as California had. The bottom line is that we cannot incarcerate many child predators and we can only do so for shorter terms than we now would think are appropriate.
For compulsive pedophiles, this is a tremendous benefit and for our society, it poses more challenges regarding the protection of children. One thing is clear, though, if we are going to offer justice to millions of survivors, our only route is to revive their expired civil SOLs. For many, that is the only route available.
There is a bonus when more civil claims are filed, which is that once a victim comes forward, others are likely to as well. That means a victim from the past can lead the way in a civil suit for more recent victims who can now file criminal charges within statute. That is what happened with the priests and monsignor in the Philadelphia Archdiocese, where the 2005 Grand Jury Report,
included not a single case that was in statute, but it led to the 2011 Grand Jury Report, which did.
The need for such legislation is underscored even more by the ruling in Peugh, because we are going to have dangerous pedophiles leaving prison earlier than had been anticipated. Hopefully, they are on a reliable sex-offender registry so that the public knows of the danger they likely still pose, but, as we have learned, tracking predators through registries can be a challenge, and the announcement of a civil lawsuit is far more likely to get the public’s (and other victims’) attention. Thus, more than ever, victims who have yet to come forward need to have a chance to file civil suits. Their doing so will send a signal to the silent current or recent victims whose criminal SOLs have not yet expired. In sum, the civil suit can trigger the prosecution needed to protect society from these repeat predators, and to protect children and provide them with justice. Therefore, civil SOLs need to be enacted that permit revival of expired civil claims, as they have in numerous states, and both criminal and civil SOLs need to be eliminated.
That is the child protection lesson of the Supreme Court’s Ex Post Facto jurisprudence.
– See more at: http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/14/the-supreme-court-renders-another-decision-interpreting-the-ex-post-facto-clause#sthash.c4nSsYiZ.dpuf
They are paying to keep their secrets. Money is the least of it
/in New Jersey /by SOL ReformRev. Michael Fugee is a New Jersey priest who was put on trial for sexually assaulting a 14-year-old boy, and later confessed to fondling the child while he was under his care… twice.
Fugee was convicted, but that conviction was later overturned by an appeals court. Instead of a retrial, Fugee was allowed to sign a binding agreement not to work with or around children. Unsurprisingly, he was arrested last month after it was revealed he attended weekend youth retreats on behalf of St. Mary’s Parish in Colts Neck.
Now, there’s no indication Fugee engaged in this type of behavior this time around, but what if he did? And what if those victims, traumatized by shame and humiliation, weren’t able to muster the strength to come forward for many years?
Well, they’d be out of luck in New Jersey, and the Catholic Church is spending lots of money to keep it that way.
Currently, the statute of limitations for a victim of child-abuse in the state isn’t ten years or even five years. It’s two years. If abuse victims don’t come forward within two years of their 18th birthday, they’re out of luck, which puts us way out of step with neighboring states. In New York, victims have until they turn 23 to file suit. In Pennsylvania and Connecticut, they have until they’re 30. Delaware doesn’t even have a limit.
State Sen. Joseph Vitale (D-19th) wants to do something about that. He is sponsoring legislation that would extend the window for statute of limitations for sexual abuse victims to 30 years.
“Protect the child molesters” doesn’t appear anywhere in the Bible that I know of, but the New Jersey Catholic Conference seems to be acting like it does, hiring the most expensive and powerful lobbying firm in Trenton, Princeton Public Affairs, to fight against Vitale’s bill
This isn’t a New Jersey-specific issue. The Catholic Church has been active in pushing back proposals that lengthen the time allowed for victims of alleged abuse to come forward. And in addition to New Jersey, high-priced lobbyists have been hired in Colorado and New York to fight similar attempts.
There position isn’t about protecting kids. It isn’t even as much about protecting priests anymore. It’s about money, pure and simple. Since the first instance of child abuse came to light, the Catholic Church has spent $2.5 billion on legal fees, settlements and prevention efforts related to sexual abuse.
We know that it’s not easy for some victims to come forward. Mike Crawford was only 13 when he said his priest fondled him. He wasn’t able to muster the strength to tell anyone until his early adulthood, which made it too late to prosecute. He now heads the New Jersey chapter of the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, and has been an outspoken advocate of extending the statute of limitations in New Jersey.
It seems to make common sense to anyone that doesn’t wear a frock and molest little kids. By extending the window for victims to come forward, we’d be allowing a judge, not a priest, to look at the evidence, review the relevant facts, and make a judgment as each individual case warrants it
“People deserve their day in court,” Crawford said, and I couldn’t agree more. After all, the Bible calls for the death penalty for child molesters, saying “it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.”
No one is calling for that. All we want is for victims to be heard. Is that too much to ask?
Source: http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/homepage-feature/item/55969-new-jersey-catholic-church-spending-big-to-keep-abuse-victims-silent&Itemid=248&linktype=hp_impact
CA window hearing June 18!
/in California /by SOL ReformCA Assembly Judiciary:
http://ajud.assembly.ca.gov/
CA Assembly:
http://assembly.ca.gov/
CA Senators:
http://senate.ca.gov/senators
History of votes:
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.
Track this bill:
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
Updated information:
www.facebook.com/
Listen Live on the 18th (starting at 9am PST): http://ajud.assembly.ca.