A U.S. district judge on Monday dismissed three sexual-abuse lawsuits against Kevin Clash, the voice of Sesame Street’s “Elmo” muppet until the allegations surfaced, saying the plaintiffs waited too long to file the civil cases.
The ruling in the cases represented a victory for Clash, a 52-year-old Baltimore County native who has repeatedly denied the allegations, but a setback to the plaintiffs, whose lawyer contends the statute of limitations effectively “silences” victims.
The lawsuits, all filed in New York federal court within the past year by now-grown men, alleged that Clash had consensual sexual relations with the plaintiffs when they were teenagers and legally unable to consent. Clash has not been charged criminally.
Clash’s attorney, Michael G. Berger, said in a statement that his client was “pleased” with the decision, which he called “an important step” toward rehabilitating his image. Berger noted that the actor, who became a worldwide celebrity giving voice to a beloved red puppet, won three Emmys last month.
“As we have maintained all along, our goal has been to put these spurious claims behind him, so that Kevin can go about the business of reclaiming his personal life and his professional standing,” Berger said. “Kevin is looking forward to a time in the near future when he can tell his story free of innuendo and false claims.”
The dismissals cast uncertainty over whether plaintiffs will get a chance to prove the allegations, and whether Clash will get the chance to refute the claims based on their merit in court.
Another New York case against Clash was voluntarily dismissed in April, leaving one surviving lawsuit.
That lawsuit is not covered by a statute of limitations because it was filed by a 24-year-old in Pennsylvania, where alleged victims have until the age of 30 to take legal action. Berger also has filed a motion to dismiss that case.
Jeff Herman, an attorney who represents the three plaintiffs in the cases dismissed Monday, said in a statement that he plans to appeal the decision and called the statute of limitations governing such cases “an arbitrary timeline that silences victims.”
Clash resigned from “Sesame Street” in November after his second accuser came forward and filed suit against him. Clash has received eight “outstanding performer” Emmys as Elmo.
Howard Bragman, who runs a public relations firm but does not represent Clash, lauded the dismissals.
“Kevin is a great guy. I have always believed that these cases were without merit and filed to humiliate Kevin into a settlement,” said Bragman, who called Clash a friend. “I am glad the court vindicated him and wish him every success as he goes through the difficult challenge of rebuilding his life and his reputation. I’m betting on him.”
The three cases dismissed Monday, from plaintiffs Cecil Singleton, Kevin Kiadii and “John Doe,” were all filed at least nine years after the abuse allegedly occurred, and several years after the plaintiffs reached the age of 21.
New York law allows civil claims of sexual abuse to be filed up to six years after the events or three years after the plaintiff turns 21, whichever time period is longer.
The man who filed under the pseudonym “John Doe” claimed in court papers that he waited 16 years to file a claim after the alleged abuse in 1996 because he wasn’t “able to make a causal connection between his injuries and the sexual acts … until 2012” and “could not reasonably be expected to know that he had been injured” before then.
Kiadii alleged that he had a multi-year relationship with Clash that began when he was 15. He claimed he was a “compliant victim” because he was not emotionally or psychologically prepared for the association.
Singleton offered similar reasoning in language “nearly identical” to that in the other complaints, U.S. District Court Judge John G. Koeltl noted.
Singleton called the dismissal and the limits on coming forward “terrible” and vowed to not give up. “It’s an individual process for someone to come to terms with what happened,” he said.
When Herman filed the lawsuits, he argued that New York’s statute of limitations gives victims six years to come forward after they comprehended that they had been victims of abuse. He said the men didn’t come to full realization of the abuse until last year.
“We believe that the victims in this case are within the statute of limitations,” Herman said in his statement. “But this ruling highlights the need for a window in New York to allow victims to have their day in court.
“This is the first battle. We plan to appeal the decision and continue the fight to be a voice for victims.”
Richard M. Serbin, a Pennsylvania attorney who specializes in sex abuse claims, said victims typically do not come forward right away.
“Most of the time it takes years for them to deal with the demons of being sexually abused, and only in adult life do they have the wherewithal and courage to come forward,” Serbin said.
Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University in New York City, said many states, including Pennsylvania, have extended their statutes of limitations, while New York has not done so.
“New York has some of the shortest statutes of limitations in the country,” for sex abuse cases, she said.
Baltimore Sun reporter Carrie Wells contributed to this article.
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Judge rejects sex abuse lawsuits against Elmo puppeteer
NEW YORK (Reuters) – A New York federal judge on Monday tossed out three child sex abuse lawsuits against Kevin Clash, the puppeteer who gave Sesame Street’s beloved Elmo character his voice.
Judge John Koeltl rejected lawsuits filed by three men who accused Clash of sexually abusing them when they were under age.
After the allegations surfaced last fall, Clash, 52, in November resigned the job he had held for 28 years as the puppeteer who brought life to Elmo, the red, furry monster featured on the international children’s television series.
The judge, of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, said the statute of limitations had run out for the lawsuits, which were filed long after the federal limit of within six years of the event for lodging complaints.
One man said Clash paid to fly him from Miami to New York for an encounter in the mid-90s; two others said they met Clash on a gay telephone chat line, one in 2003 and the other in 2004.
In 2012, a fourth man recanted his claims that Clash had sex with him when he was 16 years old.
One lawsuit against Clash is pending in federal court in Pennsylvania, filed by a fifth man who accused Clash of engaging in a sexual relationship that began in 2004 when the man was 16.
Last month, Clash won three Daytime Emmy Awards for his work on Sesame Street.
Neither Clash’s lawyer nor representatives for Sesame Street returned calls seeking comment.
(Reporting By Francesca Trianni; Editing by Barbara Goldberg and Dan Grebler)
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Background: Victims alleging that they were subjected to sexual abuse as minors brought actions under the civil remedy provision of the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act against alleged abuser. The alleged abuser moved to dismiss.
Holdings: The District Court, John G. Koeltl, J., held that:
1 discovery rule did not apply victims’ actions;
2 dates that victims connected psychological harm to their abuse was irrelevant for accrual; and
3 victims’ claims accrued on the dates they were allegedly abused.
Motion granted.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Stuart Samuel Mermelstein, Jeffrey M. Herman, Herman & Mermelstein, P.A., Miami, FL, David T. Azrin, Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP, New York, NY, Adam D. Horowitz, Herman Law, Boca Raton, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Michael G. Berger, Law Offices of Michael G. Berger, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Opinion
OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
*1 The plaintiffs, Cecil Singleton, S.M. (“John Doe”), and Kevin Kiadii, each bring claims against the defendant, Kevin Clash, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). All of the plaintiffs allege that when they were minors, the defendant used a facility or means of interstate commerce to persuade or induce them to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. John Doe also alleges that when he was a minor the defendant transported him from Florida to New York with the intent to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423. The defendant moves to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b). For the reasons explained below the motions are granted and the complaints are dismissed.
I.
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2007). The Court’s function on a motion to dismiss is “not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.
When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff’s possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. SeeChambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002); see also Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F.Supp.2d 395, 401 (S.D.N.Y.2011).
“Where the dates in a complaint show that an action is barred by a statute of limitations, a defendant may raise the affirmative defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss.” Ghartey v. St. John’s Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir.1989).
II.
The following allegations are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.
The defendant, Kevin Clash, is a resident of New York who was born in 1960. (Kiadii Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5.) The plaintiffs each allege that when they were minors, Clash engaged in sexual acts with them in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and2255. John Doe also alleges that Clash violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423.
John Doe
*2 John Doe is a Florida resident who was born in 1979. (S.M. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8.) In late 1995 or early 1996, while the defendant was visiting Miami and Doe was looking for work, the defendant befriended him. (S.M. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10.) At the time of this initial encounter, Doe was sixteen or seventeen years old. (S.M. Compl. ¶ 9.) The defendant returned home to New York but spoke with Doe often over the telephone. (S.M. Compl. ¶ 11.) In early 1996, the defendant arranged for Doe to visit him in New York. (S.M. Compl. ¶¶ 14–15.) The defendant purchased a plane ticket for Doe to fly from Miami to New York and arranged for a driver to bring Doe from the airport to the defendant’s apartment. (S.M. Compl. ¶ 15.) Doe stayed with the defendant for four days, during which time he and the defendant engaged in a variety of sexual acts. (S.M. Compl. ¶ 16.) Doe turned eighteen in 1997.
On December 10, 2012, sixteen years after the alleged sexual acts and fifteen years after Doe turned eighteen, Doe filed this action against the defendant. Doe’s complaint alleges that the defendant’s conduct violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422and 2423, and these violations gave rise to claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. (S.M. Compl. at 5–6.) Doe alleges that because he was not emotionally or psychologically prepared for a sexual relationship with a grown man, he was a “compliant victim,” and did not become aware that he had suffered adverse psychological and emotional effects from the encounter with the defendant until 2012. (S.M. Compl. ¶ 21.) Doe alleges that “he [was not] able to make a causal connection between his injuries and the sexual acts … until 2012[,]” and “could not reasonably be expected to know that he had been injured and that [the defendant] had caused his injuries until calendar year 2012.” (S.M. Compl. ¶ 22.)
Cecil Singleton
Cecil Singleton is a New York resident who was born in 1988. (Singleton Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) In or about 2003, when Singleton was fifteen years old, the defendant began communicating with Singleton on a gay telephone chat line. (Singleton Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) The defendant persuaded Singleton to meet him for sexual encounters and the two engaged in sexual activity on numerous occasions over a number of years. (Singleton Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10.) Singleton turned eighteen in 2006. (Singleton Am. Compl. ¶ 1.)
On November 20, 2012, nine years after the alleged conduct began and six years after the defendant turned eighteen,1 Singleton filed a complaint against the defendant. (Singleton Am. Compl. at 4.) The complaint alleges that the defendant’s conduct in or about 2003 violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422, and this violation gave rise to a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. (Singleton Am. Compl. at 3–4.) In language nearly identical to the language in John Doe’s complaint, Singleton alleges that because he was not emotionally or psychologically prepared for a sexual relationship with a grown man, he was a “compliant victim,” and did not become aware that he had suffered adverse psychological and emotional effects from the encounter with the defendant until 2012. (Singleton Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16.)
Kevin Kiadii
*3 Kevin Kiadii is a resident of New York who was born in 1987. (Kiadii Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8.) In 2004, when Kiadii was sixteen years old, the defendant initiated contact with Kiadii on a gay chat line and invited Kiadii to come to his apartment in Manhattan. (Kiadii Compl. ¶¶ 9–10.) Kiadii accepted the invitation and Kiadii and the defendant engaged in sexual acts in the defendant’s apartment. (Kiadii Compl. ¶ 10.) Kiadii turned 18 in 2005.
On April 2, 2013, nine years after the alleged conduct began and eight years after the defendant turned eighteen, Kiadii filed a complaint against the defendant. The complaint alleges that the defendant’s conduct in or about 2004 violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422, and this violation gave rise to a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. (Kiadii Compl. at 3–4.) In language nearly identical to the language in John Doe’s and Cecil Singelton’s complaints, Kiadii alleges that because he was not emotionally or psychologically prepared for a sexual relationship with a grown man, he was a “compliant victim,” and did not become aware that he had suffered adverse psychological and emotional effects from the encounter with the defendant until 2012. (Kiadii Compl. ¶¶ 15–16.)2
On March 1, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss all three complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the claims are timebarred.3 The motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and argued before the Court.
III.
1The plaintiffs assert claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Section 2255”). Section 2255 was enacted as part of The Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986 on October 18, 1986. Pub. L. No. 99–500, 100 Stat. 1783–39 (1986). “[Section 2255] expanded the scope of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95–225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978), to provide a civil remedy for personal injuries suffered by victims of child sexual exploitation.” Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603, 611 (E.D.Va.2005). Section 2255(a) provides:
Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section … 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, … may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $ 150,000 in value.
18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[I]n order to be subject to liability under Section 2255, a defendant must be proven to have violated at least one of the criminal statutes listed in Section 2255 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 755 (M.D.Pa.2007) (citing Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 613).
The plaintiffs claim violations of Section 2255(a) premised on underlying violations of sections 2422 and 2423.4Section 2422 provides in relevant part:
*4 (b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce … knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in … any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Section 2423 provides in relevant part:
(a) Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce … with intent that the individual engage in … any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
Id. § 2423(a).
The defendant has moved to dismiss all of the plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred under the statute of limitations. Prior to March 7, 2013,5 section 2255(b), the statute of limitations for section 2255(a), provided:
Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability.
18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006).
The parties agree that a plaintiff has six years after the cause of action accrues, or three years after the plaintiff turns twenty-one, whichever is longer, to file suit.6 See Doe v. Schneider, 667 F.Supp.2d 524, 530 (E.D.Pa.2009); Husband,376 F.Supp.2d at 616 (holding claim not time-barred when underlying statutory violation occurred within six years of the suit although the plaintiff turned twenty-one three years after the violation). The defendant argues that because none of the alleged underlying violations of sections 2422 and 2423 occurred within the limitations period, the plaintiffs’ claims under Section 2255 are barred. The plaintiffs allege that a discovery rule should apply, and that under their interpretation of the discovery rule the statute of limitations was tolled until 2012, when the plaintiffs allegedly became aware of the connection between their injuries and the defendant’s conduct.
1.
The threshold inquiry is whether a discovery rule applies to claims brought under Section 2255. The plaintiffs argue that because the statute is silent, the discovery rule applies. The defendant argues that the discovery rule is inapplicable. The text of Section 2255 counsels against implying any discovery rule. The statute specifically provides that the complaint must be filed within six years “after the right of action first accrues” or three years after a minor turns twenty-one, whichever is later. The statute is directed solely to when the claim accrues, not when it is discovered.
234“In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence….” Gabelli v. SEC, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1220, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (quoting United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S. 568, 74 S.Ct. 287, 98 L.Ed. 300, (1954)). “Thus the ‘standard rule’ is that a claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973, (2007)(internal quotation marks omitted)). The “complete and present cause of action” definition of accrual fosters “the basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Id. (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047, (2000)). “Statutes of limitations are intended to ‘promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’ ” Id. (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the cases in which a ‘statute of limitations may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself … are very limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering it.’ ” Id. at 1224 (quoting Amy v. Watertown (No. 2), 130 U.S. 320, 324, 9 S.Ct. 537, 32 L.Ed. 953 (1889)).
*5 5In contrast to the standard rule, the discovery rule provides that “accrual is delayed ‘until the plaintiff has ‘discovered’ his cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 1798, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010)). The Supreme Court recently explained that the discovery rule is “an exception to the general limitations rule that a cause of action accrues once a plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of action.’ ” Merck,130 S.Ct. at 1793 (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201, 118 S.Ct. 542, 139 L.Ed.2d 553 (1997)). However, the Supreme Court has also noted that although “lower ‘[f]ederal courts … generally apply a discovery accrual rule when a statute is silent on the issue[,]’ ” the Court “[has] not adopted that position.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) (quoting Rotella,528 U.S. at 555, 120 S.Ct. 1075). The Supreme Court has “never endorsed the … view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by explicit command,” and other than in cases of fraud or concealment, it has recognized a discovery rule only in two contexts, latent disease and medical malpractice, “where the cry for such a rule is loudest.” Id. at 27–28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
67Rather than being silent, the plain text of Section 2255 evidences congressional intent that the discovery rule should not apply. In TRW, the Court held that Congress can “convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule … by implication from the structure or text of the particular statute.” Id. Specifically, “[w]here congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to the general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 2255(b) includes an express exception to the six year statute of limitations for those persons under a legal disability when the cause of action first accrues. The exception extends the statute of limitations to three years after the disability ends, regardless of when the violation occurred, an explicit expansion of the six year limitations period. Moreover, this exception is plainly crafted to afford minors at least three years after attaining the age of eighteen to contemplate whether they choose to sue for conduct committed against them while they were minors. This exception counsels against implying an additional discovery rule into the statute. See id. at 27–29, 122 S.Ct. 441.
The only case to address accrual under Section 2255 held that a claim is only timely under Section 2255 if the “[p]laintiff can show that [the] [d]efendant violated any of the listed statutes [in Section 2255] within six years of the filing of [the] Complaint….” Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 614. However, the case did not specifically address the discovery rule because the plaintiff alleged that the last date on which the underlying statutes were violated was within six years of the date she first filed a complaint against the defendant. Id. at 614.7 Therefore, Husband provides limited guidance on the application of the discovery rule.
*6 8Congress’s failure to include language providing for the discovery rule counsels against implying it into the statute. Congress could have used language, as it has in other statutes of limitations, to indicate that the discovery rule should apply. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (“a private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws … may be brought not later than the earlier of … (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation … or (2) 5 years after such violation.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e) (“two years after the date upon which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) “[a]ny civil action under this section … shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.”); TRW, 534 U.S. at 37–39, 122 S.Ct. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing statutes that contain express discovery rule provisions); see also Guy v. Lexington–Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 488 Fed.Appx. 9, 15 (6th Cir.2012) (rejecting discovery rule in sexual abuse case under state law when state legislature was silent because “[u]nlike an injury in an asbestos case or certain medical-malpractice cases, plaintiffs’ injury was immediately apparent and not latent.”).
9Congress appreciated that it was dealing with injuries to minors and could have adopted language similar to that in state sexual abuse statutes which expressly provide for the discovery rule. See, e.g., Arnold v. Amtrak, 13 Fed.Appx. 573, 576 (9th Cir.2001) (explaining that under a Washington statute, “the limitations period only begins to run …. on the date the victim discovers the nexus between the act and the claimed injury”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Doe v. Archdiocese of Portland, No. 08 Civ. 691, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61260, at *7–12 (D. Or. June 16, 2010) (discussing Oregon discovery rule for sexual abuse victims); R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 971 A.2d 1074, 1081 (2009) (statute for sexual abuse victims provides that “the cause of action shall accrue at the time of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse” and that the “action shall be brought … within two years after reasonable discovery.”). In sum, Congress provided an exception to the six year prohibition for plaintiffs under a legal disability and provided that such minors would have an additional three years to bring a claim after they turned eighteen. This exception, combined with Congress’s failure to adopt a discovery rule in the face of statutes with explicit discovery rules and state sexual abuse statutes providing for application of a discovery rule, indicate that Congress did not provide for a discovery rule under Section 2255, and none should be implied.
*7 Without the discovery rule, the plaintiffs concede that the claims are all time-barred. (Hr’g Tr. 18–19.) The complaints in these cases were filed more than six years after the defendant’s conduct with each plaintiff ended and more than three years after each plaintiff reached the age of majority.8 Because Section 2255 does not incorporate a discovery rule, the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred and must be dismissed.
2.
For purposes of completeness, it should also be noted that the plaintiffs’ claims would also be time-barred under any reasonable construction of the discovery rule.
1011The discovery rule provides that “[t]he clock begins to run when the plaintiff has ‘inquiry notice’ of his injury, namely when he discovers or reasonably should have discovered the … injury.” Koch v. Christies’ Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir.2012) (explaining the federal discovery rule in the context of a RICO claim) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). “[D]iscovery of the injury, not discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555, 120 S.Ct. 1075. Under the discovery rule, a claim accrues when a plaintiff comes into possession of the “critical facts that he has been hurt and who inflicted the injury.” Id. at 556, 120 S.Ct. 1075(quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)); see also Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123, 100 S.Ct. 352 (plaintiff “armed with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community. To excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations statute”); A.Q.C. ex rel Castillo v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.2011) (“A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, enough ‘to protect himself by seeking legal advice.’ ”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Taking the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the plaintiffs had knowledge of the “critical facts” when the violations of the statute occurred.
12The plaintiffs’ complaints indicate that their claims accrued at the time the defendant violated sections 2422 and2423. A person may sue under Section 2255 if the person “while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section … 2422, or 2423” and “suffers personal injury as a result of such violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Any such person “shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.” Id. Under the discovery rule, the inquiry is when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the “injury.” Koch, 699 F.3d at 148. The plaintiffs concede that the statutory violations occurred outside of the limitations period. (Hr’g Tr. 18–19.)
13141516The plaintiffs suffered their personal injuries under the statute at the time they became victims under sections 2422 and 2423. “[Section 2255] does not create one category of victims and another category of people who suffer personal injuries.” Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 881 (6th Cir.2012). “A victim by definition is someone who suffers an injury.” See id. (interpreting “victim” and “personal injury” under Section 2255); see also id. at 882 (citing Webster’s Second Int’l Dictionary 2841 (1953) (defining victim as “[a] person or living creature injured … at the hands of another person.”); Oxford English Dictionary Online (3d ed. 2012) (defining victim as “[o]ne who suffers some injury, hardship, or loss.”)). “[T] he plaintiffs became victims of [the defendant’s] conduct at the same time that they suffered injuries,” namely the moment the defendant violated sections 2422 and 2423 with each plaintiff. See id. at 881.9 Based on the factual allegations in the complaints, the plaintiffs were aware of sufficient facts immediately following their victimization by the defendant to state claims under Section 2255. They were aware of the facts that, while minors, the defendant had engaged in sexual activities with them in violation of one or more federal statutes. The dates on which the plaintiffs connected their psychological injuries to their victimizations are irrelevant to the dates on which their claims accrued under Section 2255. See, e.g., Doe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 860 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1343–44 (S.D.Fla.2012) (explaining that Section 2255 imposes strict liability upon those meeting its prerequisites).
*8 1718Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege in their complaints that “as a direct and proximate result of engaging in sexual activity with [the defendant] … [the plaintiffs] suffered severe injuries, including but not limited to mental, psychological and emotional trauma. (Kiadii Compl. ¶ 14; S.M. Compl. ¶ 20; Singleton Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) Therefore, the plaintiffs’ complaints allege injuries at the time of their victimization and the claims accrued at those times. Although the plaintiffs allege that accrual was delayed until 2012 when they “bec[a]me aware of [their] injuries” and made a “causal connection between [their] injuries and the sexual acts of [the defendant]” (Kiadii Compl. ¶ 16; S.M. Compl. ¶ 22; Singleton Am. Compl. ¶ 16), these allegations are insufficient to delay accrual under the discovery rule. The discovery rule provides that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff “reasonably should have discovered the … injury.” Koch, 699 F.3d at 148 (citation omitted). The test embodies an objective standard. See Armstrong v. McAlpin,699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir.1983) (“The test as to when fraud should with reasonable diligence have been discovered is an objective one.”) (citation omitted). The complaints demonstrate, objectively, that the plaintiffs were injured when they became the defendant’s victims. In contrast, the plaintiffs’ argument for delayed accrual based on a “connection” between their injuries and the defendant’s conduct is wholly subjective. While the plaintiffs may not have recognized the extent of their injuries, they were aware of the defendant’s conduct towards them and could have brought claims. The plaintiffs’ “injuries” for the purpose of accrual under Section 2255 were their victimizations by the defendant, not their appreciation of the subsequent psychological harm.
Moreover, although no other case has considered the discovery rule under Section 2255, many courts have considered the discovery rule in the context of sexual abuse and have similarly refused to delay accrual based on allegations of a recently made “connection” between the abuse and the plaintiffs’ injuries. See, e.g., Doe v. St. Stephen’s Episcopal Sch., 382 Fed.Appx 386, 388 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (“To bring a suit, it is not necessary for the victim to connect the abuse to any subsequent psychological injuries or understand the full extent of his injuries.”);S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 20 (Tex.1996) (“A few states have refused to apply the discovery rule when the plaintiff did not repress memories of the abuse when it occurred, but did not realize that the abuse was injurious, or did not appreciate the extent of injury, or could not take action because of the psychological effects of the abuse, or simply waited.”) (collecting cases); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139, 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1992); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368 (Ct.App.1987) (superseded by Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Section 340.1 (Deering 1990));see also O’Neal v. Div. of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) (rejecting application of discovery rule to abuse victim who was aware of the abuse but not aware of the injuries because the plaintiff failed to satisfy “a prerequisite to any application of the discovery rule—ignorance … of the facts giving rise to the cause of action”);Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash.App. 781, 737 P.2d 314, 316–17 (Wash.1987) (rejecting application of discovery rule and holding “[i]t does not matter that [the plaintiff] had not discovered the causal connection to all her injures, because when [she] reached the age of majority she knew that she had substantial damages associated with the sexual abuse.”), superseded by statute as stated in C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash.2d 699, 985 P.2d 262, 269 (1999). In this case, the plaintiffs were aware of all of the facts necessary to state a cause of action underSection 2255.
*9 The plaintiffs have no support for their theory that a claim under Section 2255 should not accrue until the plaintiffs connected their injuries to the defendant’s conduct.10 The plaintiffs’ theory would allow Section 2255 claims decades beyond when the violation accrued. See, e.g., Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553–55, 120 S.Ct. 1075 (rejecting “injury and pattern discovery rule” in RICO cases because, in part, it would “extend the potential limitations period … well beyond the time when a plaintiff’s cause of action is complete.”). The plaintiffs were aware that the defendant had engaged in sexual activities with them when the events took place.
The cases the plaintiffs rely upon do not help their position. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949); White v. Mercury Marine, 129 F.3d 1428, 1431 (11th Cir.1997). In Kubrick, the Supreme Court held in the context of a medical malpractice claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act that it was discovery of the injury and its cause, and not discovery of the other elements of a claim, which govern accrual under the discovery rule. 444 U.S. at 122, 100 S.Ct. 352 (“[F]or a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury …. [t]here are others who can tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask.”). In Urie, the Court held under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, a plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when he became aware of a latent disease resulting from prolonged exposure to silica dust, not when the exposure itself occurred. 337 U.S. at 169–71, 69 S.Ct. 1018. Neither case deals with the issues presented in this case. Here, the plaintiffs knew of their injuries, namely their victimization under the statute, and its cause, namely the defendant. Therefore, the claims accrued at that time.11 Had the plaintiffs approached an attorney at that time, they could have brought claims.
1920The plaintiffs also argue that Congress intended to allow plaintiffs to bring claims based on a delayed “connection to the injury” theory because Congress amended Section 2255 in 2006 to clarify that Section 2255 is available “regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor….” Pub. L. 109–248, 120 Stat. 650.However, legislative history indicates that the clause was added to account for situations in which violations that first occurred when a plaintiff was a minor were re-perpetrated after a plaintiff reached adulthood. See Sexual Exploitation of Children over the Internet: What Parents, Kids and Congress Need to Know about Child Predators: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, 109th Cong. 456–57 (2006). For example, if a would-be defendant downloaded child pornography that is twenty years old, the “child” who is no longer a minor may bring a claim underSection 2255 based upon this new violation by the would-be defendant. See id.; Boland, 698 F.3d at 881 (“A child abused through a pornographic video might have one § 2255 claim against the video’s creator as soon as it is produced and another against the distributor who sells a copy of the video twenty years later.”). The language the plaintiffs rely upon is unrelated to delaying accrual under the statute of limitations.12
*10 Because each of the plaintiffs’ complaints was filed more than six years after each plaintiff reasonably should have become aware of the defendant’s alleged violations of sections 2422 and 2423 upon which their Section 2255 claims are predicated, and more than three years after each plaintiff turned eighteen, the claims are time-barred.
3.
The final issue is whether the recent amendment to the statute of limitations in Section 2255 resuscitates any of the plaintiffs’ stale claims. On March 7, 2013, as part of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Section 2255 was amended “by striking ‘six years’ and inserting ’10 years [.]’ ” Pub. L. No. 113–4, § 1212, 127 Stat. 54 (2013).Therefore, as of March 7, 2013, the statute of limitations was amended to provide:
Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within 10 yearsafter the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability.
18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (emphasis added).13 At the Court’s request, the parties submitted additional briefing addressing whether the 2013 amendment affects the outcome of this motion.
2122When claims have expired under an effective statute of limitations, an amendment extending the statute of limitations will not be applied retroactively to revive stale claims unless it is the clear intent of Congress to revive such claims. See In re Enterprise Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enterprise Mortg. Acceptance Co. (“Enterprise”),391 F.3d 401, 407–10 (2d Cir.2005). In Enterprise, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “the resurrection of previously time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect” and that the Sarbanes–Oxley statute, which was at issue in that case, did not revive previously expired securities fraud claims because there was no unambiguous congressional intent that the statute should apply retroactively. Id. at 406–10, 391 F.3d 401 (relying in part on Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). In this case, Section 2255is silent as to retroactivity and there is no evidence of congressional intent for the recent amendment to Section 2255 to apply retroactively to revive claims that were barred under the prior statute of limitations. Therefore, the amendment should not be applied retroactively to revive any of the plaintiffs’ expired claims. Id. at 407–10.
The plaintiffs’ supplemental memorandum does not argue that the amendment should apply retroactively. Instead, the plaintiffs argue that retroactivity is irrelevant because accrual was delayed under the discovery rule. As discussed above, the discovery rule does not save the plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, because the discovery rule does not delay accrual, and because the 2013 amendment to Section 2255 did not revive the time-barred claims, the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred and the complaints are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
*11 The Court has considered all of the arguments of the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the remaining arguments are either moot or without merit. For the reasons explained above, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and to close these cases. The Clerk is directed to close all pending motions.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Singleton’s amended complaint alleges that the sexual encounters continued for a number of years but does not provide any dates for the last sexual encounter. Because the statutes penalize sexual activity with a minor, the last possible date that the defendant could have violated the statute is the day before Singleton’s eighteenth birthday in 2006, six years before the complaint was filed. Singleton concedes that he turned eighteen in May 2006, more than six years before he filed his complaint. (Hr’g Tr. 11, May 30, 2013.)
2
A fourth complaint filed against Clash was voluntarily dismissed on April 15, 2013. See Stipulation & Order, D.O. v. Clash, 12 Civ. 8578 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013); Compl., D.O. v. Clash, 12 Civ. 8578 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012).
3
The motion to dismiss was originally filed against S.M., D.O., and Singleton. However, after the Kiadii complaint was filed, the parties agreed that the motion to dismiss would apply to the Kiadii complaint as well.
4
Kiadii and Singleton only allege claims under section 2422. (See Kiadii Compl. at 3–4; Singleton Am. Compl. at 3–4.) Doe alleges claims under both § 2422 and § 2423. (S.M. Compl. at 5–6.)
5
The statute was amended in 2013 to extend the statute of limitations. However, as addressed below, the amendment was not retroactive and is inapplicable to this case.
6
(Hr’g Tr. 12–13.)
7
The plaintiffs argue that the district court in Husband applied the discovery rule because the opinion at one point declares, “[u]nder general principles of federal law, a plaintiff’s cause of action first accrues when she possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to her that a reasonable inquiry would reveal the cause of action.” Id. at 613 (citing two cases, one applying the discovery rule and one applying the traditional accrual rule). However, the district court in Husband held that a claim was only timely if the violation of Section 2255 occurred within the limitations period. Id. at 616. The opinion never mentions the discovery rule.
8
Singleton’s claim expired in 2009, Doe’s claim expired anywhere from 2000 to 2002, and Kiadii’s claim became time-barred at some point from 2008 to 2010.
9
It is possible under Section 2255 that a person could have been a victim as a minor and suffered personal injuries later in life. See Boland, 698 F.3d at 881 (explaining that it can be one violation of Section 2255 to create child pornography, and a second violation of Section 2255 to distribute the same child pornography many years later). However, there is no allegation of a “second injury” in this case.
10
The plaintiffs also argue that because the plaintiffs suffered no injury before 2012, it would be a complete defense to a Section 2255 claim that a plaintiff suffered no actual damages, and therefore was not injured. However, even if the plaintiffs did not become aware of any monetary injuries, Section 2255presumes damages of $150,000. See Boland, 698 F.3d at 882 (“The point of [the Section 2255] minimum-damages requirement is to allow victims of child pornography to recover without having to endure potentially damaging damages hearings.”). All a plaintiff must show is that “[he or] she was the victim of a sex crime….” Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs have had complete and valid claims under Section 2255 from the time the defendant violated sections 2422 and 2423 with each of them.
11
In White, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the discovery rule to a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s engines caused him hearing loss but found the claim time-barred under the applicable three year statute of limitations because the plaintiff knew of both the injury and the cause more than three years before he filed suit. 129 F.3d at 1435 (“Because it is undisputed that White knew more than three years before he filed suit that his loss of hearing was caused by exposure to the loud engine noise, the district court correctly held that his lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations.”). In this case, the plaintiffs knew that the defendant had engaged in sexual activity with each of them.
12
Moreover, because the statute of limitations is set out in full in section 2255(b), it would make no sense for Congress to create an exception to the statute of limitations by adding language to section 2255(a).
13
The complaints in S.M. and Singleton were filed prior to the amendment. The complaint in Kiadii was filed after the amendment. However, because all three claims were time-barred prior to the amendment, the time of their filing is irrelevant. The amendment is not retroactive and therefore the amendment does not revive claims that had already expired prior to its effective date.
Attn: PROTEST DESK- Texas Department of Criminal Justice – PAROLE DIVISION VIA FAX: 512-406-5294
Re: Thomas Henry Teczar TDCJ ID# 01427425
Dear Parole Division,
I am writing to protest the proposed medical parole of the above referenced inmate, Thomas H. Teczar. As a civil attorney, I have represented eight (8) of the boys he molested in Texas. I am well aware of his long and sordid history, including his medical and psychological history, of molesting adolescent boys and vulnerable young men while he was a Roman Catholic priest in Fort Worth, Texas and Worcester Massachusetts.
He destroyed many lives. In my opinion, if released, he will be a continuing threat to the safety of the children of Texas or wherever he goes. I urge you NOT to allow his proposed medical parole.
It’s not sol, but it is child protection!
http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hamilton-Logo.jpg00SOL Reformhttp://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hamilton-Logo.jpgSOL Reform2013-06-27 19:11:292013-06-27 19:11:29Action Alert for TX organizations and residents to protect Texas's children
Daniel P. Hartstein, Esq., Liberty View, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Plaintiff Lisa Shanahan.
William J DeSantis, Esq., Ballard Spahr LLP, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Defendant the Diocese of Camden.
Opinion
OPINION
HILLMAN, District Judge.
*1 This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant the Diocese of Camden’s motion [Doc. No. 6] seeking summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons expressed below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied without prejudice.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court exercises jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Plaintiff Lisa Shanahan is a citizen of the state of North Carolina. (Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 1.) Defendant the Diocese of Camden (“the Diocese” or “Defendant”) is a New Jersey non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in the state of New Jersey, and is therefore a citizen of New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 2.) The amount in controversy is met because the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently demonstrate that the damages sought are in excess of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
II. BACKGROUND
The basic facts of this case are largely undisputed and relate to Plaintiff’s allegations that she was sexually abused as a child from approximately 1980–1981 by an ordained Catholic priest, Father Thomas Harkins (“Harkins”). During the time period relevant to Plaintiff’s claims of sexual abuse, Harkins was employed by the Diocese and served as priest at St. Anthony of Padua Catholic Church (“St.Anthony’s”) in Hammonton, New Jersey.1 (See Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts [Doc. No. 6–2] (hereinafter, “Diocese’s 56.1 Statement”), ¶¶ 2, 5–6; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts [Doc. No. 9] (hereinafter, “Pl.’s 56.1 Resp.”) ¶¶ 2, 5–6.)
Plaintiff was born in 1969 and shortly thereafter was baptized in the Catholic faith. (Compl. ¶ 5; see also Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1–2.) According to Plaintiff, her family was “devoutly Catholic” and “regularly attended mass and participated in the ministry” at St. Anthony’s. (Compl. ¶ 5; see also Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Harkins was an agent and employee of the Diocese who ministered to the congregation at St. Anthony’s and provided religious instruction to both the children and adults of the congregation. (Compl. ¶ 6; see also Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶ 5.) Harkins also apparently taught the children’s catechism classes (also known as “CCD classes”) at St. Anthony’s in order to prepare the children, including Plaintiff, for “confirmation in the Catholic faith[.]” (Compl. ¶ 7;see also Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶ 5.) Plaintiff was a student in Harkins’ CCD class from approximately 1980–1981 while she was in the fifth grade. (Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 4–5; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 4–5.)
*2 Plaintiff alleges that Harkins sexually abused her on approximately ten to fifteen (10–15) different occasions between 1980 and 1981 while she was a student in his CCD class and that these incidents took place in Harkins’ office and in his bedroom in the church rectory. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9; Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 6, 14–15.) According to Plaintiff, on these ten to fifteen various occasions, “Harkins sexually abused [her] by touching her genitals over her underwear.” (Compl.¶ 9.) Plaintiff further asserts that “the final incident of sexual abuse” occurred when “Harkins brought [Plaintiff] to his bedroom in the priest’s home, the rectory, pulled down [Plaintiff’s] tights, and sexual abused her by putting his hands on her genitals and digitally penetrating her.” (Id.) During this incident, Harkins “also tried to force [Plaintiff’s] hand onto his penis.” (Id.) At the conclusion of this incident, Plaintiff alleges that “Harkins told her that she was a good girl and reassured her that everything was okay with what he had done” to her.2 (Id.)
Plaintiff represents that Harkins’ sexual abuse of Plaintiff only ceased when he “was suddenly removed from the parish in approximately 1981, the summer before [Plaintiff] started sixth grade[,]” and that “[n]o explanation was given to the parishioners why Harkins had been removed or where he had been reassigned.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff asserts, upon information and belief, that “Harkins was removed because of an allegation made to the Diocese that he had sexually abused another young girl at St. Anthony[‘s] … and was assigned outside of the Diocese[.]” (Id.)
Based on the alleged sexual abuse she suffered as a child, Plaintiff now brings claims against the Diocese for: (1) liability under New Jersey’s Child Sexual Abuse Act (the “CSAA” or the “Act”) in Count I; (2) negligence with respect to the Diocese’s retention and supervision of Harkins in Count II; and (3) breach of fiduciary duty in Count III. Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on May 15, 2012, and counsel for the Diocese entered an appearance on July 25, 2012. Rather than filing an answer, the Diocese responded to Plaintiff’s complaint by filing the instant motion for summary judgment on September 10, 2012, prior to any discovery in this case.
III. DISCUSSION
The Diocese now seeks the entry of summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that “ ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ “ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’ “ Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
*3 Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (citation omitted); see also Singletary v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n. 2 (3d Cir.2001) (“Although the initial burden is on the summary judgment movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ‘the burden on the moving party may be discharged by “showing”—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case’ when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof.”) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A “party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the … pleading [s.]” Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted). For “the non-moving party[ ] to prevail, [that party] must ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ “ Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 F. App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir.2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57.
IV. ANALYSIS
With respect to Count I for liability under the CSAA, the Diocese argues that this claim should be dismissed as a matter of law because the Diocese did not stand in loco parentis within Plaintiff’s household. (Br. of Def. The Diocese of Camden In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 6–1] (hereinafter, “Diocese’s Br.”), 4–6.) Proceeding on the assumption that the CSAA is not applicable here, the Diocese further argues that Plaintiff’s remaining common law claims for negligent retention and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty are barred by the relevant two-year statute of limitations for such claims. (Id. at 7–9.) Plaintiff opposes the Diocese’s motion contending that the Diocese has failed to meet its burden under Rule 56 and that the motion should be denied in its entirety. (Br. of Pl. Lisa Syvertson Shanahan in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 9–2] (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Opp’n”), 4.)
A. Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Child Sexual Abuse Act
*4 When it was enacted in 1992, the CSAA “established the first statutory cause of action for sexual abuse in New Jersey.” Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, 188 N.J. 69, 902 A.2d 900, 909 (N.J.2006) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.. § 2A:61B–1). The CSAA defines sexual abuse as “an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between a child under the age of 18 years and an adult.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 61B–1 (a)(1). The Act further defines sexual abuse to include circumstances where “[a] parent, resource family parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis within the household … knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person[.]” Id.
As recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the “CSAA thus establishes two classes of abusers: those persons who inflict the abuse (active abusers), and those persons who stand in loco parentis within the household who know of the abuse and who fail to protect the child (passive abusers).”3 Hardwicke, 902 A.2d at 910. To establish liability under the CSAA against a passive abuser, the plaintiff, as a threshold matter, must demonstrate that the defendant is: “(1) a person (2) standing in loco parentis (3) within the household.”4 Id. at 911. The Act, however, does not define these terms. Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint asserts liability on the theory that the Diocese qualifies as a passive abuser under the CSAA. Plaintiff alleges that the Diocese: (1) is a “person” as defined by the Act; (2) stood in loco parentis to Plaintiff; (3) was included within Plaintiff’s household; and (4) knowingly permitted or acquiesced in Harkins’ sexual abuse of Plaintiff. (Compl.¶¶ 39–40.)
(1) Is the Diocese a “Person” Under the CSAA?
The New Jersey Supreme Court has previously held that the definition of “person” under the CSAA is not limited to natural persons and includes institutional or entity defendants such as schools or the Diocese. Hardwicke, 902 A.2d at 911–13; see also J.H. v. Mercer Cnty. Youth Det. Ctr., 396 N.J.Super. 1, 930 A.2d 1223, 1229 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2007) (concluding “that a county, as a municipal corporation, is a corporation included within the definition of person contained in N.J.S.A. 1:1–2 and thus constitutes a ‘person’ under the CSAA.”). Moreover, for purposes of this action the parties do not dispute that the Diocese is considered a “person” within the meaning of the Act. (See Diocese’s Br. 4–6; see also Pl.’s Opp’n 5.)
The parties disagree as to the remaining threshold issues of whether the Diocese stood in loco parentis to Plaintiff and whether the Diocese was included within Plaintiff’s household. A determination that the Diocese both stood in loco parentis to Plaintiff and was within Plaintiff’s household under the CSAA is clearly material to the success of Plaintiff’s claim. If the facts demonstrate that the Diocese both stood in loco parentis and was within Plaintiff’s household, then Plaintiff’s CSAA claim is still viable. On the other hand, if either of these conditions is not met, then Plaintiff’s CSAA claim fails at the outset. The continuing viability of Plaintiff’s CSAA claim also has significant implications relating to the statute of limitations for her common law claims. Accordingly, the Court resolves the in loco parentis and household issues as preliminary matters here.
(2) Did the Diocese Stand In Loco Parentis?
*5 The phrase in loco parentis “literally translated means ‘in the place of a parent.’ “ Hardwicke, 902 A.2d at 913 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed.2004)). Relying on the literal translation, the Diocese argues that Plaintiff’s contact with the Diocese through St. Anthony’s was limited to attendance at weekly CCD classes and mass, and that such “intermittent and superficial contact” is insufficient for the Court to conclude that the Diocese acted as Plaintiff’s parents. (Diocese’s Br. 6.)
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court has provided a more expansive meaning of in loco parentis—one that is particularly relevant in cases brought under the CSAA. The Hardwicke court described the meaning of in loco parentisas “ ‘relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caregiver of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.’ “ 902 A.2d at 913 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary). The in loco parentis relationship is usually temporary in nature and is marked by characteristics that include “the responsibility to maintain, rear and educate the child, as well as the duties of supervision, care and rehabilitation.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that the Diocese’s characterization of its role regarding Plaintiff is “disingenuous and an unsupportable inference made improperly in the movant’s favor.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 6.) In support of her contention that the Diocese stood in loco parentis to her, Plaintiff points out that the Diocese offered the CCD classes she attended on church grounds and that Harkins exercised exclusive supervision and control over Plaintiff and the other children during that time. (Id.) In fact, Plaintiff has certified that after mass (where the children sat separately from their parents), Harkins “would lead [Plaintiff] and the other children away from [their] parents and take [the children] up to” his “private office at the Church” where Harkins conducted CCD classes “with the door closed.” (See Certification of Lisa Syvertson Shanahan [Doc. No. 9–1] ¶ 5.) Plaintiff has further certified that multiple instances of her sexual abuse actually occurred in Harkins’ “office during the CCD classes” in question “outside the view of the other children.” (Id. ¶ 6, 902 A.2d 900.) Plaintiff also contends that by “enrolling their children in CCD classes, parents [at St. Anthony’s] entrusted their children to” the Diocese “just as they do in the case of any public or private school.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 6.)
In light of the inadequately developed record, the Court finds that the Diocese has failed to meet its summary judgment burden on the issue of whether it stood in loco parentis to Plaintiff. The Diocese offers virtually no facts regarding the setup and structure of the CCD classes the Diocese provided at St. Anthony’s which Harkins taught. The Diocese does not even describe, let alone offer any evidence to demonstrate, what responsibilities Harkins may have over Plaintiff during these CCD classes. Rather, the Diocese makes multiple conclusory statements simply reiterating that it did not stand in loco parentis to Plaintiff.5 As a result, the Court is left without sufficient information to accurately and conclusively determine whether the Diocese stood in loco parentis based on the nature of the Diocese’s responsibilities to Plaintiff.
*6 In contrast to the minimal evidence offered by the Diocese, Plaintiff’s certification provides information that suggests the Diocese may have stood in loco parentis to Plaintiff. Based on this certification, it is clear that, at a minimum, Harkins had a responsibility for Plaintiff’s religious education as a member of the Catholic faith as well as a responsibility to supervise and care for Plaintiff during the time the CCD classes were in session. Moreover, it is precisely during these classes that Plaintiff alleges she was sexually abused by Harkins. Given that Plaintiff’s evidence—as the nonmoving party—is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in her favor, Marino, 358 F.3d at 247, and in light of the lack of evidence presented by the Diocese, a finding that the Diocese did not stand in loco parentis to Plaintiff is premature at this time.
(3) Was the Diocese Within Plaintiff’s Household?
Of the three threshold requirements under the CSAA, the parties most vigorously disagree as to whether the Diocese was within the Plaintiff’s household as that phrase is construed for purposes of the CSAA. Each side directs the Court to case law from federal or state courts in New Jersey resolving the issue in their favor. (Compare Diocese Br. 5–6) (citing Y.G. V. BD. of Educ. for Twp. of Teaneck, No. A–5146–09T2, 2011 WL 1466277 (N.J.Super. App. Div. Apr 19, 2011); D.M. v. River Dell Regional High School, 373 N.J.Super. 639, 862 A.2d 1226 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2004);SMITH V. ESTATE of Kelly, 343 N.J.Super. 480, 778 A.2d 1162 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2001)); (with Pl.’s Opp’n 7–9) (citing Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07–2091, 2008 WL 1743436 (D.N.J. Apr.15, 2008)).
The Diocese argues that Plaintiff’s attendance at weekly CCD classes and mass are not enough to establish the Diocese as a member of Plaintiff’s household. (Diocese’s Br. 6.) Plaintiff counters that “Harkins’ involvement with Plaintiff’s family extended directly into their ‘household’, as [Harkins, an agent of the Diocese,] came to Plaintiff’s home in grooming her and gaining the trust of Plaintiff and her family.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 9.) Plaintiff’s certification describes, to some extent, the nature of the relationship which existed at that time between Harkins, Plaintiff, and her family. She certifies that “Harkins took a special interest in [her], and gave [her] honors, gifts and took [her] to outings off church grounds.” (See Certification of Lisa Syvertson Shanahan [Doc. No. 9–1] ¶ 4.) One of the “special” honors Harkins bestowed upon Plaintiff, was giving her readings to perform during the weekly mass at St. Anthony’s. (Id.) Plaintiff’s certification makes clear that on more than one occasion, Harkins “would come to [Plaintiff’s] house for [her] to practice the readings, and [to] have dinner with [Plaintiff] and [her] family.” (Id.) In doing so, Plaintiff represents that Harkins “ingratiated himself to [Plaintiff] and [her] family.” (Id.)
*7 In Hardwicke, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined whether a private boarding school was considered within the plaintiff’s household for purposes of a CSAA claim. 902 A.2d at 914–15. In ruling on this issue, the Hardwicke court explicitly recognized that the term “ ‘[h]ousehold is not a word of art’ “ and that its meaning cannot be “ ‘confined within certain commonly known and universally accepted limits.’ “ Id. at 914 (citing Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800, 804 (N.J.1961)). As the Hardwicke court observed, the meaning of “household” under New Jersey law greatly “depends on the circumstances of the case and has not been restricted to persons with familial relations[,]” nor has it been limited “to include only those residing under the same roof.”6 Hardwicke, 902 A.2d at 915. Rather, “ ‘a determination as to a party’s status as a ‘household member’ must be based upon the qualities and characteristics of the particular relationship and not upon a mechanistic formula in a definition.’ “ Id. (citation omitted).
A thorough review of the cases relied upon by the parties deciding the household issue demonstrates to the Court that the determination of whether a defendant is within the plaintiff’s household under the CSAA is a highly fact specific inquiry which requires examination of the “qualities and characteristics of the particular relationship” in question. In the present motion, the Diocese has failed to identify any portion of the record which establishes the qualities and characteristics specific to the relationship between Harkins and Plaintiff with respect to the issue of “within the household”. Similarly to the in loco parentis issue, the Diocese’s motion fails to provide sufficient pertinent information from which the Court can make a determination of whether the Diocese can be considered as within Plaintiff’s household.
In contrast, even before discovery has commenced in this case, Plaintiff has presented evidence through her certification that Harkins sought her out not only in church during CCD classes, but also at her home where he came to practice readings for mass with Plaintiff and to attend dinner with Plaintiff and her family. Plaintiff’s certification demonstrates that Harkins took affirmative steps to interact with Plaintiff beyond the four walls of St. Anthony’s and actively sought out close personal interaction with Plaintiff and her family, in the privacy of their home. Believing Plaintiff’s evidence at this early stage and drawing all justifiable inferences in her favor, see Marino, 358 F.3d at 247,Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issue of within the household—at least at this early stage of the litigation. Harkins’ conduct in coming to Plaintiff’s home to practice readings and have dinner with her family suggests more than the “intermittent and superficial contact” the Diocese contends existed here.
*8 The Court therefore denies the motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s CSAA claim without prejudice to the Diocese’ right to renew this motion if discovery reveals a sufficient factual basis to support a renewed motion on the issues of in loco parentis and “within the household.” Cf. Scholar Intelligent Solutions, Inc. v. New Jersey Eye Center,P.A., No. 13–642, 2013 WL 2455959, at *2 (D.N.J. June 5, 2013) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment as premature where it was brought “before discovery ha[d] even begun”).
B. Statute of Limitations on Common–Law Claims
In Hardwicke, the defendant argued that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the relaxed discovery rule provisions of the CSAA with respect to his common-law claims, including one for negligent hiring, supervision and retention. 902 A.2d at 919. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this argument and found that “any common-law claims based on conduct that falls within the definition of sexual abuse … may be brought under the liberal tolling provision associated with the two-year statute of limitations in the CSAA.” Id. Where a valid CSAA claim is present, the Court must “look to the provisions of the CSAA in determining whether the common law causes of action alleged in the [c]omplaint” are barred by the Act’s statute of limitations.7 See Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07–2091, 2008 WL 1743436, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr.15, 2008).
To the extent the Diocese argues that Plaintiff’s common law claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for such claims under N.J. STAT. ANN.. § 2A:14–2, this argument is best addressed after a fuller development of Plaintiff’s CSAA claim. As the Court has already concluded, Plaintiff’s CSAA claim remains viable at this time. Therefore, the Court need not rule on the statute of limitations issue under N.J. STAT. ANN.. § 2A:14–2 regarding Plaintiff’s common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision and retention at this time.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant the Diocese of Camden’s motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Footnotes
1
The record reflects that Harkins was defrocked as a Catholic priest in approximately 2002, and now works as a security guard at the Philadelphia International Airport. (See Diocese’s 56.1 Statement ¶ 16; Certification of Lisa Syvertson Shanahan [Doc. No. 9–1] ¶ 12.)
2
Plaintiff was approximately eleven years old at the time the abuse occurred. (Certification of Lisa Syvertson Shanahan [Doc. No. 9–1] ¶ 2.)
3
“The passive abuser, however, can claim an affirmative defense based on a ‘reasonable fear’ of the active abuser as described by the statute.” Hardwicke, 902 A.2d at 910. This affirmative defense is not at issue here.
4
Ultimately the plaintiff must also show that the passive abuser “knowingly permit or acquiesce[d] in sexual abuse by any other person.” N.J. STAT. ANN.. § 2A:61B–1 (a)(1).
5
(See Diocese’s Br. 5–6) (“… there is no basis for this court to conclude that the Diocese functioned as plaintiff’s parent.”); (“[n]o court could conclude that, as a result of this intermittent and superficial contact, the Diocese acted as plaintiff’s parents …”).
6
The Diocese argues that because the term household is not defined in the CSAA it should be given its plain or common meaning, which is “ ‘a group of people who dwell under the same roof.’ “ (Diocese’s Reply Br. 4) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 7th ed.1999). The Hardwicke decision makes clear that this argument has no merit under New Jersey law with respect to CSAA claims. 902 A.2d at 915.
7
A CSAA cause of action accrues “ ‘at the time of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse[.]’ “ R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 971 A.2d 1074, 1081 (N.J.2009). “Thus, the statute of limitations for a cause of action pursuant to the [CSAA] is two years ‘after reasonable discovery.’ “ Id. “[I]n addition to a flexible statute of limitations, the Act [also] contains a broad tolling provision[.]” Id.
http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hamilton-Logo.jpg00SOL Reformhttp://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hamilton-Logo.jpgSOL Reform2013-06-27 02:19:242014-01-09 02:34:33 Shanahan v. Diocese of Camden, Civ. A. No. 12–2898 (NLH/KMW), 2013 WL 3283959
Voice of Elmo Kevin Clash gets three sex-abuse lawsuits thrown out
/in Maryland, New York /by SOL ReformA U.S. district judge on Monday dismissed three sexual-abuse lawsuits against Kevin Clash, the voice of Sesame Street’s “Elmo” muppet until the allegations surfaced, saying the plaintiffs waited too long to file the civil cases.
The ruling in the cases represented a victory for Clash, a 52-year-old Baltimore County native who has repeatedly denied the allegations, but a setback to the plaintiffs, whose lawyer contends the statute of limitations effectively “silences” victims.
The lawsuits, all filed in New York federal court within the past year by now-grown men, alleged that Clash had consensual sexual relations with the plaintiffs when they were teenagers and legally unable to consent. Clash has not been charged criminally.
Clash’s attorney, Michael G. Berger, said in a statement that his client was “pleased” with the decision, which he called “an important step” toward rehabilitating his image. Berger noted that the actor, who became a worldwide celebrity giving voice to a beloved red puppet, won three Emmys last month.
“As we have maintained all along, our goal has been to put these spurious claims behind him, so that Kevin can go about the business of reclaiming his personal life and his professional standing,” Berger said. “Kevin is looking forward to a time in the near future when he can tell his story free of innuendo and false claims.”
The dismissals cast uncertainty over whether plaintiffs will get a chance to prove the allegations, and whether Clash will get the chance to refute the claims based on their merit in court.
Another New York case against Clash was voluntarily dismissed in April, leaving one surviving lawsuit.
That lawsuit is not covered by a statute of limitations because it was filed by a 24-year-old in Pennsylvania, where alleged victims have until the age of 30 to take legal action. Berger also has filed a motion to dismiss that case.
Jeff Herman, an attorney who represents the three plaintiffs in the cases dismissed Monday, said in a statement that he plans to appeal the decision and called the statute of limitations governing such cases “an arbitrary timeline that silences victims.”
Clash resigned from “Sesame Street” in November after his second accuser came forward and filed suit against him. Clash has received eight “outstanding performer” Emmys as Elmo.
Howard Bragman, who runs a public relations firm but does not represent Clash, lauded the dismissals.
“Kevin is a great guy. I have always believed that these cases were without merit and filed to humiliate Kevin into a settlement,” said Bragman, who called Clash a friend. “I am glad the court vindicated him and wish him every success as he goes through the difficult challenge of rebuilding his life and his reputation. I’m betting on him.”
The three cases dismissed Monday, from plaintiffs Cecil Singleton, Kevin Kiadii and “John Doe,” were all filed at least nine years after the abuse allegedly occurred, and several years after the plaintiffs reached the age of 21.
New York law allows civil claims of sexual abuse to be filed up to six years after the events or three years after the plaintiff turns 21, whichever time period is longer.
The man who filed under the pseudonym “John Doe” claimed in court papers that he waited 16 years to file a claim after the alleged abuse in 1996 because he wasn’t “able to make a causal connection between his injuries and the sexual acts … until 2012” and “could not reasonably be expected to know that he had been injured” before then.
Kiadii alleged that he had a multi-year relationship with Clash that began when he was 15. He claimed he was a “compliant victim” because he was not emotionally or psychologically prepared for the association.
Singleton offered similar reasoning in language “nearly identical” to that in the other complaints, U.S. District Court Judge John G. Koeltl noted.
Singleton called the dismissal and the limits on coming forward “terrible” and vowed to not give up. “It’s an individual process for someone to come to terms with what happened,” he said.
When Herman filed the lawsuits, he argued that New York’s statute of limitations gives victims six years to come forward after they comprehended that they had been victims of abuse. He said the men didn’t come to full realization of the abuse until last year.
“We believe that the victims in this case are within the statute of limitations,” Herman said in his statement. “But this ruling highlights the need for a window in New York to allow victims to have their day in court.
“This is the first battle. We plan to appeal the decision and continue the fight to be a voice for victims.”
Richard M. Serbin, a Pennsylvania attorney who specializes in sex abuse claims, said victims typically do not come forward right away.
“Most of the time it takes years for them to deal with the demons of being sexually abused, and only in adult life do they have the wherewithal and courage to come forward,” Serbin said.
Baltimore Sun reporter Carrie Wells contributed to this article.
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Childhood Sexual Abuse & Statute of Limitations in PA
/in Pennsylvania /by SOL ReformRead more: http://fox43.com/2013/07/01/childhood-sexual-abuse-in-pa/#ixzz2XtRpCdMl
More cases tragically shut down by short SOLs.
/in New York /by SOL ReformJudge rejects sex abuse lawsuits against Elmo puppeteer
NEW YORK (Reuters) – A New York federal judge on Monday tossed out three child sex abuse lawsuits against Kevin Clash, the puppeteer who gave Sesame Street’s beloved Elmo character his voice.
Judge John Koeltl rejected lawsuits filed by three men who accused Clash of sexually abusing them when they were under age.
After the allegations surfaced last fall, Clash, 52, in November resigned the job he had held for 28 years as the puppeteer who brought life to Elmo, the red, furry monster featured on the international children’s television series.
The judge, of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, said the statute of limitations had run out for the lawsuits, which were filed long after the federal limit of within six years of the event for lodging complaints.
One man said Clash paid to fly him from Miami to New York for an encounter in the mid-90s; two others said they met Clash on a gay telephone chat line, one in 2003 and the other in 2004.
In 2012, a fourth man recanted his claims that Clash had sex with him when he was 16 years old.
One lawsuit against Clash is pending in federal court in Pennsylvania, filed by a fifth man who accused Clash of engaging in a sexual relationship that began in 2004 when the man was 16.
Last month, Clash won three Daytime Emmy Awards for his work on Sesame Street.
Neither Clash’s lawyer nor representatives for Sesame Street returned calls seeking comment.
(Reporting By Francesca Trianni; Editing by Barbara Goldberg and Dan Grebler)
Copyright © 2013, Reuters
Francesca Trianni
Reuters (Chicago Tribune)
3:08 PM CDT, July 1, 2013
View/Download as a PDF: http://sol-reform.com/New_York/July2013/More-cases-tragically-shut-down-by-short-SOLs.pdf
Singleton v. Clash, No. Nos. 12 Civ. 8465(JGK), 12 Civ. 8948(JGK), 13 Civ. 2172(JGK)., 2013 WL 3285096 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)
/in Cases (NY), New York /by SOL ReformS.D. New York.
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Action Alert for TX organizations and residents to protect Texas’s children
/in Texas /by SOL ReformTexas – Action Alert for TX organizations and residents to protect Texas’s children.
Please write & fax (512-406-5294) to to keep this dangerous predator in prison!
Sample letter: (View sample letter as PDF)
Attn: PROTEST DESK- Texas Department of Criminal Justice – PAROLE DIVISION VIA FAX: 512-406-5294
Re: Thomas Henry Teczar TDCJ ID# 01427425
Dear Parole Division,
I am writing to protest the proposed medical parole of the above referenced inmate, Thomas H. Teczar. As a civil attorney, I have represented eight (8) of the boys he molested in Texas. I am well aware of his long and sordid history, including his medical and psychological history, of molesting adolescent boys and vulnerable young men while he was a Roman Catholic priest in Fort Worth, Texas and Worcester Massachusetts.
He destroyed many lives. In my opinion, if released, he will be a continuing threat to the safety of the children of Texas or wherever he goes. I urge you NOT to allow his proposed medical parole.
It’s not sol, but it is child protection!
Shanahan v. Diocese of Camden, Civ. A. No. 12–2898 (NLH/KMW), 2013 WL 3283959
/in Cases (New Jersey), New Jersey /by SOL ReformView News Article: Suit accusing priest survives challenge by Diocese of Camden
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