,

Bryson v. Diocese of Camden, Civil Action No. 12–499 (JBS–KMW), 2013 WL 3956360 (D. N.J. July 26, 2013)

denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and finding that that Court should conduct a hearing pursuant to Lopez v. Swyer to determine whether evidence of the prejudice the defendant incurred outweighed other determinative factors for equitable tolling
,

Shanahan v. Diocese of Camden, Civ. A. No. 12–2898 (NLH/KMW), 2013 WL 3283959

reserving judgment on whether the plaintiff’s common law claims were barred by the statute of limitations until after Plaintiff’s CSAA claim was more fully developed
,

Bryson v. Diocese of Camden, Civ. A. No. 12–499 (JBS–KMW) , 2013 WL 1501795 (D. N.J Apr. 21, 2013)

upholding the Magistrate Judge’s ruling of limited discovery for the parties’ upcoming Lopez hearing because discovery for preliminary hearings is meant to be limited and the Magistrate’s decision was neither an abuse of discretion nor “clearly erroneous.”
,

Bryson v. Diocese of Camden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D.N . J. 2012)

holding that although the CSAA did not toll the statute of limitations for the plaintiff’s claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, based on New Jersey’s flexible and equitable discovery rule and language in D.M. v. River Dell Reg’l High Sch., the plaintiff should be allowed to make an argument for equitable tolling at a preliminary hearing to prove his claims that he repressed memories of his abuse
,

R.L., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VOYTAC, 199 N.J. 285, 971 A.2d 1074 (N.J.2009).

At issue in this matter is the interpretation of the statute of limitations provision of the Child Sexual Abuse Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1. The Act provides in relevant part that an action for child sexual abuse shall be brought within two years after the 'reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse.' N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1b. Additionally, the Act provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations because of 'the plaintiff's mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.' N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1c. We conclude that pursuant to the Act, the trial court must first determine when a reasonable person subjected to childhood abuse would discover that the defendant's conduct caused him or her injury. That is an objective test. If that period is more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the court must next determine whether the statute should be tolled because of 'the plaintiff's mental state, duress by the defendant, or any other equitable grounds.'