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1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (5) (“Within three years an action – …5. for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated.”)

TOLLING:

1. Discovery, yes. liberal, but narrowly construed as to effects/causation. But subject to 10 year.  statute of repose. See, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (16)

a. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (16) (“Unless otherwise provided by statute, for personal injury or physical damage to claimant’s property, the cause of action, except in causes of actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c), shall not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs. Provided that no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.

b. Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 369, 546 S.E.2d 632, 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“A discovery statute allows a statute of limitations to not begin to run until plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered, that he was injured as a result of defendant’s wrongdoing.”);

i. Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 367, 546 S.E.2d 632, 637, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 313, 10-11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“Significant for the purposes of this appeal, “the three-year period of time for [emotional distress] claims does not begin to run (accrue) until the ‘conduct of the defendant causes extreme [or severe] emotional distress. Sometimes, causes of action for emotional distress take years to manifest the severe emotional results required to complete the tort.”) (internal citations omitted).

ii. Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 368-369, 546 S.E.2d 632, 637, 2001 N.C. App. LEXIS 313, 12-13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to when plaintiff manifested signs of “severe emotional distress.” By his own admission, he manifested signs of “severe emotional distress” — “shame,” “confusion,” alcohol abuse, inability “to form healthy relationships,” inability to “lead a normal life,” “several mental breakdowns,” and “contemplat[ion of] suicide” — following his 1986 departure from NCSA and for the next seven years of his life. Based on this evidence, it is clear that plaintiff’s “severe emotional distress” and PTSD diagnosis could have been “generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so,” at that time. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97 (emphasis added). Therefore, we find that plaintiff’s admissions forecast sufficient evidence of his “severe emotional distress” and PTSD. Consequently, plaintiff’s “severe emotional distress” and PTSD matured to the level of being actionable after his leaving NCSA in the summer of 1986.

While it may be true that until diagnosis, plaintiff was not aware that he suffered from PTSD by that name, plaintiff’s admissions show  that he did know for some years after leaving NCSA in 1986 that he was suffering from some sort of emotional distress. We find that because plaintiff’s emotional distress could have been generally recognized and diagnosed as PTSD by a medical professional in 1986, it was not latent.”)

c. Doe v. Doe, 973 F.2d 237, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18272 (4th Cir. N.C. 1992) (granting motion to dismiss where last act of abuse occurred 23 years earlier, while noting that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (16) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (5) can under some facts operate together to give a victim a total of 13 years from majority in which to file, at the latest age 31).

2. Majority, yes 18

a. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-17(a) (A person entitled to commence an action who is under a disability at the time the cause of action accrued may bring his or her action within the time limited in this Subchapter, after the disability is None,… when the person must commence his or her action, or make the entry, within three years next after the removal of the disability, and at no time thereafter.)

b. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-17(a)(1)(within the age of 18 years).

State v. Johnson, 167 S.E.2d 274, 279 (N.C. 1969) [“In this State no statute of limitations bars the prosecution of a felony.”]