SOL: +20 years from accrual. Accrual at liberal discovery vs natural persons, Accrual at majority vs. institutions.

1. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(D) “ Every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person as set forth in subdivision 6 of § 8.01-249 shall be brought within 20 years after the cause of action accrues.”

2. SOL was extended to 20 years in 2011, The 2011 amendments by cc. 617 and 641 are identical, and added subsection D. (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243)


1. Majority, yes.

a. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229 (“If an infant becomes entitled to bring such action, the time during which he is within the age of Majority shall not be counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought except as to any such period during which the infant has been judicially declared emancipated”)

2. Discovery, YES, injury + causation

a. BUT only available versus PERSONS only (not institutions)!!!

b. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249 (6) (“In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.01-229 or when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist. As used in this subdivision, “sexual abuse” means sexual abuse as defined in subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 and acts constituting rape, sodomy, object sexual penetration or sexual battery as defined in Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2”)

c. Kopalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 645 S.E.2d 439, 442 (Va. 2007) (“Statutory amendment to accrual of personal injury actions arising from sexual abuse occurring during infancy, which provided that action accrued when plaintiff was informed by health care professional that injuries were caused by sexual abuse, applied only to actions against natural persons, pursuant to constitutional enabling provision under which it was adopted, and diocese was not natural person.”)

d. McConville v. Rhoads, 67 Va. Cir. 392, 394-395 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) (“Virginia follows the rule that “the words of a constitution are to be understood in the sense in which they are popularly employed,” and “every word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense meaning, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.” Quesinberry v. Hull, 159 Va. 270, 274-75, 165 S.E. 382, 383 (1932). A “natural person” is defined as “a person produced by nature — a human being.” Armstrong v. NEWVA Enterprises, 23 Va. Cir. 352, 355 (1991) (involving Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act). According to this definition, the Diocese and Convent of Sisters are not natural persons. (“Even though Virginia Code § 8.01-249(6) does not include the phrase natural person, the statute should be construed in light of the enabling constitutional amendment, Article IV, § 14, paragraph 4. “No act of the legislature . . . should be so construed as to bring it into conflict with constitutional provisions.” Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 227, 72 S.E.2d 506, 511 (1952). The reasonable interpretation of the language in the statute based on the enabling amendment is that it only pertains to individuals. In addition, statues in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly  construed. Hyman v. Glover, 232 Va. 140, 143, 348 S.E.2d 269, 271, 3 Va. Law Rep. 607 (1986). A narrow construction of the statute is that it only applies to natural persons.”)

None for felonies. See, Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 2213-13-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 20, *9 n.5 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015)

Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 2213-13-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 20, 2015 WL 324627, at *4 n.5 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015) (“We note that, ‘[c]onsistent with the common law, Virginia has no general statute of limitation on felonies.’ Anderson v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 704, 711, 634 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2006); see also Foster v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 574, 576, 606 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2004), aff’d, 271 Va. 235, 623 S.E.2d 902 (2006)”).