CALIFORNIA
SOL: 1 yr revival from 2003-2204; + 8 years from majority or + 3 yrs from liberal discovery
1. Cal Code Civ Proc § 340.1 (a) (“In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions: (1) An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse. (2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (3) An action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.”)
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, yes liberal.
a. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1(a) (“…the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse”);
2. Minority, yes. Cal Code Civ Proc § 340.1(a) (…the date plaintiff attain majority).
COLORADO
SOL:
1. +6 years from majority vs. perp. only Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-80-103.7(1)
a. BUT SEE, after +15 Years: Plaintiff may only recover damages for medical and counseling treatment and expenses, plus costs and attorney fees. Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-80-103.7(3.5(c)).
2. +2 years for most claims vs. employers. Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-80-102 (1)(a), (1)(h); Sandoval v. Archdiocese of Denver, 8 P.3d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000)
a. Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-80-102 (1)(a). “Tort actions, including but not limited to actions for negligence, trespass, malicious abuse of process, malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, interference with relationships, and tortious breach of contract”
b. Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-80-102(1)(h) “All actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity, except as otherwise provided in this section or section 13-80-103”
3. +3 years for breach of fiduciary duty. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(1)(f).
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, yes, liberal
a. Sailsbery v. Parks, 983 P.2d 137, 138 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Section 13-80-108, Colo. Rev. Stat. 1998, provides that a cause of action accrues on the date ‘both the injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.’”);
2. Majority, yes. Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-80-103.7(a); Sandoval v. Archdiocese of Denver, 8 P.3d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000)
CONNECTICUT
SOL:
1. None if events forming the civil claim led to conviction of first-degree aggravated sexual or sexual assault. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577e
2. + 30 yrs from majority otherwise. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d
a. “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority.”
TOLLING:
1. Majority, yes. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d
2. Discovery, common law version yes, was narrow; but application mooted by current CSA statute:
a. Tarnowsky v. Socci, 856 A.2d 408 (Conn. 2004) (finding that statute of limitations does not begin to run until the injured party knew, or reasonably should have known, the identity of the tortfeasor)
i. BUT SEE, application of any common law discovery is mooted by statutory language in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d –Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2496 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 15 1997) (statute moots common law discovery and by its own language acts as statute of repose)
DELAWARE:
SOL:
1. No statute of limitations as to perpetrator, or as to gross negligence against employer. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8145(a)-(b).
2. 2-Year Window (2007-2009): Open from July 1, 2007. Id.
TOLLING:
1. Majority, yes.
a. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8116 (“If a person entitled to any action comprehended within Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 8101-8115, shall have been, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, under disability of infancy or incompetency of mind, this chapter shall not be a bar to such action during the continuance of such disability, nor until the expiration of three years from the removal thereof”)
2. Discovery, yes, narrow. Application Mooted by elimination.
a. Whitwell v. Archmere Acad., Inc., No: 07C-08-006 (RBY), 2008 Del. Super. LEXIS 141 at *17, 2008 WL 1735370 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2008) (“[P]laintiff presented psychological evidence showing that he mentally blocked the nine years of abuse…under the Discovery Rule for inherently unknowable injuries. This rule forces the statute of limitations to begin when the injury becomes known or knowable if it was otherwise inherently unknowable.”)
FLORIDA:
SOL: None for sexual battery vs victim under age 16; +7 yrs form majority or + 4 from liberal discovery for most other crimes
1. 1.None for sexual batteries committed against victims under 16 years old. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (9). (**site currently mistakenly reads sub section 10, should be fixed).
a. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (9) (“An action related to an act constituting a violation of s. 794.011 involving a victim who was under the age of 16 at the time of the act may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such action other than one which would have been time barred on or before July 1, 2010.”) (“related to” indicates applicability to perp and employer).
b. (Thus, for cases barred prior to 2010 it is possible that the 4 yr. SOL of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(a) applied against employers in some cases.)
2. 2. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (7)(“An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later.”)
TOLLING
1. Discovery, yes, liberal via statute
a. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(7) (“from time of discovery by injured party of both injury and causal relationship between injury and abuse”);
b. Old CL version of discovery rule in FL was narrow.
2. Minority, yes. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (7) (the age of majority).
GEORGIA
1. SOL: + 5 yrs from majority vs. perp; +2 yrs form majority vs employer
a. Off. Code Ga. Ann. § 9-3-33.1 (b) (“ Any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within five years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority”)
i. Perp only. See, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1(a)
b. Off. Code Ga. Ann. § 9-3-33 (“Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues”)
2. TOLLING:
a. Majority, yes, OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (b); O.C.G.A. § 39-1-1(a)
b. Discovery, Very Unlikely. M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797, 805 (11th Cir. Ga. 1999) (holding Georgia discovery rule limited in application to “continuing torts” and defining such injuries as those “which developed from several years of frequent (even continuous) exposure to the defendant’s tortious conduct” while rejecting application where injuries were “the result of four instances of abuse, all of which occurred within a few months.”)
i. Further language in statute itself re: “from majority” could act to moot issue of discovery application textually.
ii. But, if ever found applicable, discovery would be liberal form of rule: “Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows (or reasonably should know) the cause of her injury” Westminster Schools, 172 F.3d at 804.
HAWAI’I
SOL: 4 yr window currently open Apr 2012-Apr 2016; +8yrs from majority or + 3yrs from liberal discovery
1. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-1.8(a)(1)(“Eight years after the eighteenth birthday of the minor or the person who committed the act of sexual abuse attains the age of majority, whichever occurs later; or
2. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-1.8(a) (2)(“Three years after the date the minor discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of minor’s eighteenth birthday was caused by the sexual abuse,
3. 4 yr Window § 657-1.8(b)
TOLLING:
1. Majority, yes. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-1.8(a).
2. Discovery, yes, liberal.
a. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-1.8(2) (“…date the minor discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of minor’s eighteenth birthday was caused by the sexual abuse”);
b. Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196, 201-02 (Haw. 1996) (holding that issue of when plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered psychological injury and that injury was caused by C.S.A. was fact question for jury, because total repression of memory of abuse not always necessary to avail oneself of delayed discovery);
IOWA;
SOL: +4 years from liberal (causal) discovery, where discovery occurs after majority. +1 yr from majority where causal discovery occurs before majority.
1. Iowa Code § 614.8A (“An action for damages for injury suffered as a result of sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a child, but not discovered until after the injured person is of the age of majority, shall be brought within four years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse.”)
a. Tolling only where causal discovery made after majority?
2. Iowa Code § 614.1(12) “Sexual abuse or sexual exploitation by a counselor, therapist, or school employee. An action for damages for injury suffered as a result of sexual abuse, as defined in section 709.1, by a counselor, therapist, or school employee, as defined in section 709.15, or as a result of sexual exploitation by a counselor, therapist, or school employee shall be brought within five years of the date the victim was last treated by the counselor or therapist, or within five years of the date the victim was last enrolled in or attended the school.”
a. No tolling provision via text of statute?
TOLLING:
1. Majority, yes. Limited. Iowa Code § 614.8(2) “Except as provided in section 614.1, subsection 9, the times limited for actions in this chapter, or chapter 216, 669, or 670, except those brought for penalties and forfeitures, are extended in favor of minors, so that they shall have one year from and after attainment of majority within which to file a complaint pursuant to chapter 216, to make a claim pursuant to chapter 669, or to otherwise commence an action.”
a. It says 1 yr to commence an action post majority, not tolled to majority?
2. Discovery, yes, liberal. Iowa Code § 614.8A (“An action for damages for injury suffered as a result of sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a child, but not discovered until after the injured person is of the age of majority, shall be brought within four years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse.”)
INDIANA –
SOL: + 7 from accrual (narrow discovery) or + 4 from leaving dependency of abuser whichever is later; +2 from majority where accrual occurred during minority
1. Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-2-4 (b) “An action for injury to a person that results from the sexual abuse of a child must be commenced within the later of: (1) seven (7) years after the cause of action accrues; or (2) four (4) years after the person ceases to be a dependent of the person alleged to have performed the sexual abuse.”
TOLLING:
1. Majority, yes.
a. Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 1-1-4-5(8) “Infant” or “minor” means a person less than eighteen (18) years of age.
b. Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-6-1 (“A person who is under legal disabilities when the cause of action accrues may bring the action within two (2) years after the disability is removed.) (minority is “legal disability w/in meaning of statute).
2. Discovery, yes, narrow.
a. Doe v. United Methodist Church, 673 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind. 1996) (“Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another. … For a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full extent of the damage be known or even ascertainable but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred.”);
b. The discovery rule applies when determining the accrual date for all tort actions. UNR-Rohn v. Summit Bank, 687 N.E.2d 235, 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 1558 (1997).
∑ Indiana SOL –IN — + 2 yrs from majority, + 7 yrs. from accrual (occurring at narrow discovery) or + 4 yrs. from leaving dependency of abuser whichever is latest.
ILLINOIS:
SOL: None. Eliminated prospectively as of Jan. 2014.
1. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (f) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages based on childhood sexual abuse may be commenced at any time; provided, however, that the changes made by this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly [P.A. 98-276] apply to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly if the action would not have been time barred under any statute of limitations or statute of repose prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.”)
a. Prospective/extension of open claims only. Revival unconst in Illinois.
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, yes. Statute imposes liberal discovery rule. (CL version was narrow/unavailable to many—legislature overruled Courts’ interp. in 1993).
a. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (a) (“the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.”)
2. Majority, yes.
a. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(d) “The limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run before the person abused attains the age of 18 years; and, if at the time the person abused attains the age of 18 years he or she is under other legal disability, the limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run until the removal of the disability.”
IDAHO:
SOL: +5 from majority or liberal discovery
Idaho Code § 6-1704 (1) (“Notwithstanding any limitation contained in chapter 2, title 5, Idaho Code, an action under the provisions of this chapter must be commenced within five (5) years from the date that an aggrieved child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years or, after the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, within five (5) years of the time the child discovers or reasonably should have discovered the act, abuse or exploitation and its causal relationship to an injury or condition suffered by the child, whichever occurs later.”)
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, liberal. Idaho Code § 6-1704(1) (“…t]he time child discovers or reasonably should have discovered the act, abuse or exploitation and its causal relationship to injury or condition suffered, whichever occurs later”); Idaho Code § 6-1704(2) (“The child need not establish which act in a series of continuing acts, abuse or exploitation caused the injury complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator which is part of a common scheme or plan.”);
2. Majority, yes. (“from the date that an aggrieved child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years”) Idaho Code § 6-1704 (1)
KANSAS:
SOL: +3yrs from majority or from liberal discovery, whichever is later.
1. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-523 (a) “No action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced more than three years after the date the person attains 18 years of age or more than three years from the date the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.”
a. Cosgrove v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 332 Fed. Appx. 463, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 12110 (10th Cir. Kan. 2009) (Applying § 60-523(a) to all plaintiff’s claims versus supervisory agency, its employees and perpetrator foster parents).
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, yes, liberal, via statute
a. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-523 (c) “Discovery that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse shall not be deemed to have occurred solely by virtue of the person’s awareness, knowledge or memory of the acts of abuse. The person need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse incidents caused the injury or illness complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator which is a part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse.”
b. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-523 (a) (“from the date the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse”)
2. Majority, yes. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-523 (a) (“after the date the person attains 18 years…”)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: DC page “not found” on SOL reform site. Button inactive.
SOL: + 7 yrs from majority or + 3 from narrow discovery
1. D.C. Code § 12-301 (11) (“for the recovery of damages arising out of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor– 7 years from the date that the victim attains the age of 18, or 3 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting abuse, whichever is later”)
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, yes, narrow. D.C. Code § 12-301(11) (“[F]rom when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting abuse”);
a. Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768 (D.C. App. 1998) (finding that date victim recalled his repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse was date of inquiry notice, thus also accrual, and that appreciation of full harm not necessary to start running of SOL);
2. Majority, yes. D.C. Code § 12-301(11) (“from the date that the victim attains the age of 18”)
KENTUCKY:
SOL: +5 from majority, + 5 from last act, or +5 from narrow discovery, whichever is latest vs. perp; +1 from majority or accrual (at narrow discovery) vs. employer
1. + 5 vs perp
a. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.249 (2) “A civil action for recovery of damages for injury or illness suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse or childhood sexual assault shall be brought before whichever of the following periods last expires: (a) Within five (5) years of the commission of the act or the last of a series of acts by the same perpetrator; (b) Within five (5) years of the date the victim knew, or should have known, of the act; or (c) Within five (5) years after the victim attains the age of eighteen (18) years.”
2. + 1 yr from accrual vs. employers
a. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) “The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: (a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her husband, his wife, child, ward, apprentice, or servant”
b. Roman Catholic Bishop of Louisville v. Burden, 168 S.W.3d 414, 417-418, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 351, 8-9 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“Thus, it is clear that the focus of the General Assembly was on “victims” rather than those whom the “victims” might attempt to hold liable for abuse. However, the language of KRS 413.249, just as that used by the legislatures of Rhode Island, Colorado and California, appears to be directed at perpetrators and not third parties since it sets forth sexual offenses which a third party, such as a church or a school would be incapable of committing. Based on the foregoing, it is the Opinion of this Court that KRS 413.249 does not apply to the cases currently before the Court”)
TOLLING:
a. Majority: yes.
i. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.249(2)(b) (“…[T]he date the victim knew, or should have known, of the act”) (versus perp) (statute applies vs perp only)
ii. Ky.Rev.Stat § 413.170 (1) (“ If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160, except for a penalty or forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of action accrued, an infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought within the same number of years after the removal of the disability or death of the person, whichever happens first, allowed to a person without the disability to bring the action after the right accrued.”) (versus all defendants)
b. Discovery, yes.
i. Yes, narrow (knowledge only):
1. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.249(2)(b) (“…[T]he date the victim knew, or should have known, of the act”) (statute applies vs. perp only)
2. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (“In the case sub judice, Secter does not allege memory loss and was aware of his injury (being sexually abused) within one year of his reaching the age of majority. Thus, his injury would not fall within the discovery rule under Rigazio, supra.”) (Common law discovery rule in KY very narrow essentially = tolling for fully repressed memories only)
a. Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.170(1) did not apply b/c even if the son later suffered from post-traumatic memory loss which made him of unsound mind, this had not been the case at the time of the abuse, when the action accrued).
MINNESOTA:
SOL: 3 year retroactive window open 2013-2016; No SOL for most CSA claims including negligence; +6 from majority for respondeat superior claims. Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2) – (4).
1. 2013 Minn. ALS 89, 2013 Minn. Chapter Law 89, 2013 Minn. H.F. No. 681. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY. (a) This section is effective the day following final enactment. Except as provided in paragraph (b), this section applies to actions that were not time-barred before the effective date. (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of alleged sexual abuse of an individual under the age of 18, if the action would otherwise be time-barred under a previous version of Minnesota Statutes, section 541.073, or other time limit, an action for damages against a person, as defined in Minnesota Statutes, section 541.073, subdivision 1, clause (2), may be commenced no later than three years following the effective date of this section. This paragraph does not apply to a claim for vicarious liability or respondeat superior, but does apply to other claims, including negligence. This paragraph applies to actions pending on or commenced on or after the effective date.
2. Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2) (“…may be commenced at any time in the case of alleged sexual abuse of an individual under the age of 18, except as provided for in subdivision 4; and (3) must be commenced before the plaintiff is 24 years of age in a claim against a natural person alleged to have sexually abused a minor when that natural person was under 14 years of age.”)
3. Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2)(b) (The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continuous series of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury.)
4. Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2)(c) This section does not affect the suspension of the statute of limitations during a period of disability under section 541.15
5. Minn. Stat. § 541.073(3) Applicability. — This section applies to an action for damages commenced against a person who was a cause of the plaintiff’s damages either by (1) committing sexual abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligence.
6. Minn. Stat. § 541.073 (4) (Vicarious liability or respondeat superior claims. — A claim for vicarious liability or liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior must be commenced within six years of the alleged sexual abuse, provided that if the plaintiff was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged abuse, the claim must be commenced before the plaintiff is 24 years of age. This subdivision does not limit the availability of these claims under other law.)
TOLLING:
Majority, yes. 18.
1. Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2)(c) This section does not affect the suspension of the statute of limitations during a period of disability under section 541.15
2. Minn. Stat. § 541.15(1) that the plaintiff is within the age of 18 years.
Discovery, yes, liberal (causal)
1. D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 389-390 (Minn. 2002) (delayed discovery statute applies to both damages claims for sex abuse and those for negligence).
a. Likely inapplicable to respondeat superior claims. See, Minn. Stat. § 541.073 (4)
2. D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 2002) (“Significantly, the delayed discovery statute also provides that the six-year period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that his or her personal injury was caused by sexual abuse.”)
MISSOURI:
SOL: + 10 yrs from age 21, or +3 from liberal discovery vs perp; only; +5 yrs from age 21 or liberal discovery for any 3rd party claims
1. Rev. Stat. Mo. § 537.046(1) As used in this section, the following terms mean: (1) “Childhood sexual abuse”, any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of eighteen years and which act would have been a violation of section 566.030, 566.040, 566.050*, 566.060, 566.070, 566.080*, 566.090, 566.100, 566.110*, or 566.120*, or section 568.020; (2) “Injury” or “illness”, either a physical injury or illness or a psychological injury or illness. A psychological injury or illness need not be accompanied by physical injury or illness.
2. Rev. Stat. Mo. § 537.046(2) (“Any action to recover damages from injury or illness caused by childhood sexual abuse in an action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced within ten years of the plaintiff attaining the age of twenty-one or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever later occurs.”)
3. Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17125 (8th Cir. Mo. 2011) (finding that § 537.046 does not apply to nonperpetrator defendants).
4. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.371 (incest, 10 yrs)
5.. Rev. Stat. Mo § 516.120 (4) “Within five years: An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated”)
How to deal w/ GIBSON here vs/ religious employers??
TOLLING:
1. Majority, yes, Age 21.
a. § 516.170. (“Except as provided in section 516.105, if any person entitled to bring an action in sections 516.100 to 516.370 specified, at the time the cause of action accrued be either within the age of twenty-one years, or mentally incapacitated, such person shall be at liberty to bring such actions within the respective times in sections 516.100 to 516.370 limited after such disability is removed.”)
2. Discovery, YES.
a. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100 (“[T]he cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if more than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief obtained.”)
b. Straub v. Tull, 128 S.W.3d 157, 162-63 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (application of delayed discovery proper for claims under both Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.371 (incest) and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.046).
MONTANA:
SOL: + 3 from liberal discovery (can be retroactive to revive claims filed after 1989, regardless of when cause of action arose).
1. Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-216(1)(a)-(b)
a. “27-2-216 Tort actions — childhood sexual abuse. (1) An action based on intentional conduct brought by a person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse must be commenced not later than: (a) 3 years after the act of childhood sexual abuse that is alleged to have caused the injury; or (b) 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse.
b. Werre v. David, 275 Mont. 376, 913 P.2d 625, 1996 Mont. LEXIS 38, 53 Mont. St. Rep. 187 (Mont. 1996) (Tolling provisions of Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-216 included negligence claims based on intentional sexual abuse because the words based upon in § 27-2-216 were broad enough to include negligence claims. )
c. “Applies to all claims filed after 1989, regardless of when cause of action arose” Retroactive application of the statute of limitations for torts based on sexual abuse, Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-216, was not unconstitutional on due process grounds under Mont. Const. Art. II, § 17, because it was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of the state. See, Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 262 Mont. 175, 864 P.2d 776, 1993 Mont. LEXIS 359, 50 Mont. St. Rep. 1501 (Mont. 1993)
TOLLING:
1. Discovery, yes, liberal
a. 27-2-216 (1)(b) “after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse.”
b. Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 262 Mont. 175, 864 P.2d 776, 1993 Mont. LEXIS 359, 50 Mont. St. Rep. 1501 (Mont. 1993).
2. Majority, yes 18.
a. Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-401(1) “If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in part 2, except 27-2-211(3), is, at the time the cause of action accrues, either a minor or has been committed pursuant to 53-21-127, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limit for commencing the action. However, the time limit cannot be extended more than 5 years by the disability of commitment.”
i. Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 198 Mont. 47, 643 P.2d 576, 1982 Mont. LEXIS 774, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P9285 (Mont. 1982) (noting majority at age 18)